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INTRODUCTION
A 9.0 magnitude undersea megathrust earthquake hit Japan on
March 11, 2011, with an epicenter approximately 130 kilometers (eighty
miles) off the coast of the city of Sendai.1 The earthquake triggered de-
structive tsunami waves, which reached estimated heights of up to 38.9
meters in the Miyako Prefecture,2 and traveled up to six kilometers (3.7
miles) inland in the Miyagi area.3 The Japanese National Police Agency
has confirmed 15,870 dead, 6119 injured, and 2813 missing, as well as over
one million buildings damaged or destroyed.4 The earthquake and tsu-
nami have caused extensive and severe damage, including heavy damage
to roads, railways, and households.5 Estimates of the damage are still 
1 Fukushima Accident 2011, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info
/fukushima_accident_inf129.html (last updated Sep. 17, 2012). Sendai is located about
350 kilometers (220 miles) north of Tokyo.
2 INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, IAEA INTERNATIONAL FACT FINDING EXPERT MISSION OF
THE FUKUSHIMA DAI-ICHI NPP ACCIDENT FOLLOWING THE GREAT EAST JAPAN EARTHQUAKE
AND TSUNAMI 19 (2011), available at http://www-pub.iaea.org/mtcd/meetings/pdfplus/2011
/cn200/documentation/cn200_final-fukushima-mission_report.pdf.
3 Tsunami Damage, OPINION 3/11: VIEWS FROM JAPAN ON THE MARCH 11 DISASTER (June 29,
2011), http://japanecho.net/311-data/1205/.
4 Damage Situation and Police Countermeasures Associated with 2011 Tohoku District—
Off the Pacific Ocean Earthquake, JAPANESE NATIONAL POLICE AGENCY, http://www.npa
.go.jp/archive/keibi/biki/higaijokyo_e.pdf.
5 Nam-Yi Yun & Masanori Hamada, A Comparative Study on Human Impacts Caused
by the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Disaster Mitigation, INT’L SYMP. ON 
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increasing every day, and already total several hundred billion Japanese
yen.6 This makes the March earthquake the most expensive recorded
natural disaster in Japan.7
Fukushima is a prefecture located in the Thoku region, 175 kilo-
meters (109 miles) away from the epicenter of the earthquake.8 The earth-
quake led to the shut down of three units in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear
power plant.9 A 15-meter tsunami followed the earthquake and arrived
at Fukushima, which topped the plant’s six meter seawall and lead to the
failure of the cooling system.10 The equipment failures resulted in core melt
down and releases of radioactive materials.11 The severity of the nuclear
accident is rated 7 on the International Nuclear Event Scale (“INES”),12
the same as the Chernobyl disaster of April 1986.13
The earthquake and tsunami in Japan have caused serious casu-
alty and property damage. Substantial economic losses can also be expected
from the nuclear accident; the total losses in terms of personal injury, prop-
erty damage, and economic losses resulting from the tsunami and nuclear
accident are yet unknown.14
ENGINEERING LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE 2011 GREAT EAST JAPAN EARTHQUAKE, 1666
(2012), available at http://www.jaee.gr.jp/event/seminar2012/eqsympo/pdf/papers/61.pdf.
6 See Victoria Kim, Japan Damage Could Reach $235 Billion, World Bank Estimates, L.A.
TIMES (Mar. 21, 2011), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fgw-japan-quake-world-bank
-20110322,0,3799976.story; Bo Zheng, Top 5 Most Expensive Natural Disasters in History,
ACCUWEATHER.COM (Mar. 30, 2011), http://www.accuweather.com/blogs/news/story/47459
/top-5-most-expensive-natural-d.asp.
7 See Bo Zheng, supra note 6.
8 U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, Magnitude 9.0—Near the East Coast of Honshu, Japan, http://
earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/recenteqsww/Quakes/usc0001xgp.php.
9 WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, supra note 1.
10 See Japan ‘Unprepared’ for Fukushima Nuclear Disaster, BBC NEWS (June 7, 2011),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/mobile/world-asia-pacific-13678627.
11 Id.
12 WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, supra note 1. The INES was introduced in 1990 by the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency (“IAEA”) to communicate to the public the importance
of safety regarding nuclear and radiological events. INES: The International Nuclear and
Radiological Event Scale, INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, http://www.iaea.org/Publications
/Factsheets/English/ines.pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2012). “[T]he INES Scale explains the
significance of events from a range of activities, including industrial and medical use of
radiation sources, operations at nuclear facilities, and transport of radioactive material.”
Id. Events are classified on the scale at seven levels. The severity of an event is about ten
times greater for each increase in level on the scale. Id.
13 Richard Black, Fukushima: As Bad as Chernobyl?, BBC NEWS (Apr. 12, 2011), http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-13048916.
14 See Bo Zheng, supra note 6.
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This article examines how the catastrophic losses that resulted from
the natural disaster and from the nuclear accident can be compensated in
Japan. We examine this on the basis of the preexisting legal rules intended
to address victim compensation. To the extent that they are already known,
we also provide the estimates of the losses and the amount of the payments
already made, although these numbers continue to change. Through this
lens, the compensation systems for earthquake damage and nuclear dam-
age are critically analyzed. The question how to ensure adequate compen-
sation to victims is especially important, given the problem of whether
the tsunami could be considered a “force majeure,” which would exclude
the liability of the nuclear power plant operator. We compare the compen-
sation models available in Japan to international conventions, as well as
national legislation in the U.S. and some European legal systems. We are
especially interested in the question of what type of compensation mech-
anism (operator or third-party liability, private insurance, or government
intervention) is in place and how these work together to compensate
victims. Following this analysis, we discuss the compensation system for
natural disasters and more particularly for earthquake damage in Japan;
next, we discuss the compensation system for nuclear damage and
provide a brief comparison with other compensation mechanisms.
I. THE COMPENSATION SYSTEM FOR NATURAL DISASTERS IN JAPAN
Japan has an extensive record of catastrophic events, including
earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, typhoons, and tsunamis.15 Twenty
percent of the world’s earthquakes and ten percent of earthquakes of
magnitude 6.0 or higher have occurred in the Japanese archipelago.16 In
Japan, more than 1000 earthquakes are felt every year, many of which
cause damage.17 It is reported that from the Meiji Period until 2004
(1891–2004), there were at least twenty-two major earthquakes in Japan,
with death tolls varying from twenty-five to 142,000 casualties.18
15 See Ishaan Tharoor, Japan and the Quake: A Long History of Living with Disaster,
TIME, Mar. 12, 2011, http://world.time.com/2011/03/12/japan-and-the-quake-a-long-history
-of-living-with-disaster/.
16 NON–LIFE INSURANCE RATING ORGANIZATION OF JAPAN, EARTHQUAKE INSURANCE IN
JAPAN 4 (2008), available at http://www.nliro.or.jp/english/earthquake.html (last visited
Nov. 2, 2012) [hereinafter NLIRO].
17 See Takuji Imai, Earthquake Insurance on Dwelling Risks in Japan, in ASIAN CATAS-
TROPHE INSURANCE 59, 59 (Charles Scawthorn & Kiyoshi Kobayashi eds., 2008).
18 See CABINET OFFICE OF JAPAN, EARTHQUAKES IN JAPAN, http://www.bousai.go.jp/jishin
/chubou/taisaku_gaiyou/pdf/hassei-jishin.pdf. These numbers include both dead and missing
persons. Id.
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TABLE 1: MAJOR EARTHQUAKES IN JAPAN SINCE THE MEIJI PERIOD19
Name of the
Earthquake
Date of
Occurrence
Seismic
Intensity
Damage
Dead and
Missing
Persons
Buildings
Completely
Destroyed
Mino-Owari
Earthquake
10/28/1891 8.0 7273 142,177
Sanriku 6/15/1896 8.5 About
22,000
11,723
Kanto (Kwanto) 9/1/1923 7.9 About
142,000
576,262
Tango 3/7/1927 7.3 2925 12,629
Sanriku 3/3/1933 8.1 3064 6067
Tottori 9/10/1943 7.2 1083 7736
Tonankai 12/7/1944 7.9 1251 19,367
Mikawa 1/13/1945 6.8 2306 5539
Nankaido 12/21/1946 8.0 1443 13,119
Fukui 6/28/1948 7.1 3769 40,035
Hokkaido 3/4/1952 8.2 33 921
5/23/1960 9.5 139 2830
Niigata 6/16/1964 7.5 26 2250
Off the East
Coast of Honshu
5/16/1968 7.9 52 691
Off the Coast of
Izu Peninsula
5/9/1974 6.9 30 139
Izu-Oshima 1/14/1978 7.0 25 96
Miyagi-Oki 6/12/1978 7.4 28 1183
Central Japan
Sea
5/26/1983 7.7 104 987
West Nagano 9/14/1984 6.8 29 24
Hokkaido
Nansei-Oki
7/12/1993 7.8 230 601
Kobe 1/17/1995 7.3 6436 111,054
Near the West
Coast of Honshu
10/23/2004 6.8 46 2827
In response to natural catastrophes, Japan’s government and
markets have established several programs and instruments to provide
compensation to victims, with a particular focus on insurance. Insurance
19 See CABINET OFFICE OF JAPAN, EARTHQUAKES IN JAPAN, http://www.bousai.go.jp/jishin
/chubou/taisaku_gaiyou/pdf/hassei-jishin.pdf.
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policies are, for example, available for the risks of volcanic eruptions,
floods and storms.20 Coverage of these disasters is granted systematically
by private companies and then distributed via the international reinsur-
ance market.21 Because earthquakes are one of the most serious catastro-
phes confronting Japan, a comprehensive compensation system has been
established separate from and unique to this market. This section focuses
on the compensation system for damage from earthquakes in Japan.
Earthquakes and tsunamis can result in catastrophic damage to
society, including personal injury and death, business interruption, and
damage to infrastructure, including roads and harbors, and buildings.22
In addition to personal injury and death, the damage to households, busi-
nesses, and industry are the most significant losses arising from an earth-
quake. In Japan, two different regimes have been established, one for
households and one for business and industry.23 For risks to households,
two systems are available for providing insurance coverage: one is provided
by private insurers with strong government involvement, and the other one
is provided by cooperative insurers, known as Kyosai.24 Commercial and
industrial risks are covered primarily by the private insurance market.25
This section examines the two separate compensation systems in turn.
In addition to insurance for households and commercial/industrial risks,
there are a few other insurance policies that cover earthquake damage.
Some of these products are briefly discussed as well.
Insurance is not the only form of compensation available to the
victims of catastrophes; government also plays an important role in pro-
viding relief to the victims. This section also tries to sketch the framework
of the various government-supported regimes.
A. Compensation for Households in Case of an Earthquake
The large earthquakes in the history of Japan have triggered the
establishment of an elaborate compensation system that evolves with every
new disaster. For example, an earthquake insurance system for residential
20 CONSORCIO DE COMPENSACIÓN DE SEGUROS, NATURAL CATASTROPHES INSURANCE COVER:
A DIVERSITY OF SYSTEMS 86–87 (2008), available at http://consorseguros2.tirea.es/textos
/datos/pdf/extra/naturalCatastrophes.pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2012).
21 Id. at 86.
22 L. Don Leet, Earthquake, in 9 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA INTERNATIONAL EDITION
544, 544–46 (1999).
23 NLIRO, supra note 16, at I.
24 CONSORCIO DE COMPENSACIÓN DE SEGUROS, supra note 20, at 91.
25 See id.
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buildings and household goods was established after the Great Niigata
Earthquake in 1964.26 This system is unique because of its cooperation be-
tween private non–life insurance companies and the national government.27
In addition, insurance can also be provided by cooperative insurers, known
in Japan as Kyosai.
In addition to the insurance system, other instruments have evolved
to indemnify victims in case of damage. For example, the Kobe earthquake
of 1995, also referred to as the Great Hanshin earthquake, which cen-
tered in the Hyogo Prefecture, led to the establishment of a mutual aid
system in that prefecture.28 The insurance provided by private insurers,
cooperative insurers, and other compensation instruments are discussed
respectively here.
1. Earthquake Insurance for Households Provided by
Private Insurers
a. History of the System
The 1964 Niigata Earthquake killed twenty-six, injured 447 others,
destroyed 1960 residences completely and partially destroyed 6640 others.29
Responding to the huge amount of damage, the Minister of Finance con-
sulted with the Insurance Council, requesting a report about potential
26 NLIRO, supra note 16, at 29.
27 Yuichi Takeda, Government as Reinsurers of Last Resort: The Japanese Perspective, in
CATASTROPHE RISKS AND REINSURANCE: A COUNTRY RISK MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE 225,
226–27 (Eugene N. Gurenko ed., 2004).
28 HYOGO PREFECTURE, PHOENIX MUTUAL AID SYSTEM (2010), http://web.pref.hyogo.jp
/wd34/documents/kyosaieibunpamphlet.pdf. The Kobe earthquake of 1995 triggered the
introduction of a governmental aid system. Under this system, the government provides
financial support to disaster victims whose homes are totally destroyed or who suffer
similar damage. In addition, some local governments also try to provide aid for victims
of earthquake damage. The Mutual Housing Recovery Support System established in the
Hyogo Prefecture provides such an example. Id; see also Norio Maki, How Can Public
Sector Support Recovery of Privately Owned Individual Housing after Natural Disaster?
Possibility of Setting Housing Recovery Grant in Japan, 2ND INT’L CONFERENCE ON URBAN
DISASTER REDUCTION (2007), available at http://www.ncdr.nat.gov.tw/2ICUDR/2icudr_cd
/PDF/7_3_2.pdf. A more detailed discussion of government aid and the mutual system
occurs later in this article.
29 See Kazuhiro Kawachimaru, Disaster Risk Management in Japan, CONFERENCE ON
CATASTROPHIC RISKS AND INSURANCE 3 (2004), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd
/16/39/33912671.pdf.
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measures to stabilize the livelihood of the nation after major earthquakes.30
The Insurance Council made its report on the earthquake insurance sys-
tem in 1965, ushering in an era of change to the industry.31
The Japanese insurance industry was initially reluctant to provide
earthquake insurance due to scarce reinsurance capacity and difficulties
in determining insurance costs.32 Later, the government and insurance
industry made a promise to establish a public-private partnership to pro-
vide earthquake insurance coverage. Under this kind of system, insurers
provide insurance and are reinsured by the government.33
Three laws were passed to create the new system. The Law Con-
cerning Earthquake Insurance (“the Law”) was passed in 1966.34 “The
objective of this law is to promote the diffusion of earthquake insurance
by having the Government reinsure the earthquake insurance liabilities”
and help “stabilize the livelihoods of the victims.”35 The Enforcement
Order for the Law Concerning Earthquake Insurance (“the Enforcement
Order”) and the Regulation for Enforcing the Law Concerning Earthquake
Insurance (“the Regulation”) were passed in the same year.36
Coverage under the system was originally somewhat limited. The
insurance system established under this regime only provided coverage
for residential buildings and household goods.37 It covered losses due to
earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, or tsunami.38 The insurance contract was
made incidental to householders’ comprehensive insurance,39 and it cov-
ered only total loss.40 In later amendments, coverage was broadened to
half loss and partial loss.41 The insured amount for the earthquake risk
30 See NLIRO, supra note 16, at 29.
31 Id.
32 See Imai, supra note 17, at 60–62.
33 Takeda, supra note 27, at 226–27.
34 Jishin hoken ni kansuru houritsu [The Law Concerning Earthquake Insurance], Law
No. 73 of 1966, art. 1 (Japan), translated in NLIRO, supra note 16, at 76–80.
35 Id.
36 NLIRO, supra note 16, at 81–85.
37 The Law Concerning Earthquake Insurance, art. 2, para. 2, (1).
38 Id. at art. 2, para. 2, (2).
39 As originally enacted, the earthquake insurance policy was automatically attached to the
householder’s comprehensive insurance. In other words, the attachment was compulsory
in 1966. See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, EARTHQUAKE INSURANCE: LESSONS FROM INTER-
NATIONAL EXPERIENCE AND KEY ISSUES FOR DEVELOPING EARTHQUAKE INSURANCE IN THE
PRC, app. (2008), available at http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/developing-earthquake
-insurance-prc.pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2012).
40 NLIRO, supra note 16, at 112.
41 Id. at 113.
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was thirty percent of householders’ comprehensive insurance, with a limit
of 900,000 yen (11,553 USD)42 for buildings and 600,000 yen (7,702 USD)
for household goods.43 The limit of the total payment amount for insurance
claims due to a single earthquake was capped at thirty billion yen (385
million USD).44
This legislation has been revised several times since its initial en-
actment. The most recent revision of the Law took place in 1999,45 while
the most recent revisions of the Enforcement Order and Regulation were
in 2011.46 After decades of development, some significant changes have
been made to the earthquake insurance system. For example, the attach-
ment method—whereby one form of insurance can be bound with others—
was changed to “automatic attachment in principle,”47 and earthquake
insurance has been attached to fire insurance since 1980.48 The propor-
tion insured under these policies was extended from thirty percent of the
value of the homeowners’ comprehensive insurance to a range of thirty to
fifty percent of the total fire insurance.49 The limit of earthquake insur-
ance is now set at 50 million yen (642 thousand USD) for a residential
building and 10 million yen (132 thousand USD) for household and per-
sonal goods.50 The coverage provided by the insurance policy has also been
extended to incorporate half loss and partial loss.51
Correspondingly, the premium rates have also been changed.
Since the recent revision, there are two kinds of premium rates: the basic
rate and the discount rate.52 The basic rate is based on the location, the
42 The transfer of Japanese Yen and Euro into USD in this article is based on the ex-
change rate on October 1, 2012. Foreign Exchange Rates, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h10/current/ (last visited
Nov. 2, 2012).
43 NLIRO, supra note 16, at 29.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 76.
46 Id. at 81, 85.
47 Id. at 31. Under this system, the earthquake insurance policy is automatically added to
all types of fire insurance policies, but policyholders can still choose to exclude it. Therefore,
under the revision in 1980, the attachment for the earthquake insurance changed from com-
pulsory to optional. Id.; see also Hiroaki Tsubokawa, Japan’s Earthquake Insurance System,
in 4 JOURNAL OF JAPAN ASSOCIATION FOR EARTHQUAKE ENGINEERING 154, 156 (2004).
48 Tsubokawa, supra note 47, at 156.
49 NLIRO, supra note 16, at 112–13.
50 Shikorei Jishin hoken ni kansuru houritsu [The Enforcement Order for the Law Concern-
ing Earthquake Insurance], Cabinet Order No. 164 of 1966, art. 2 (Japan), translated in
NLIRO, supra note 16, at 81 [hereinafter Enforcement Order].
51 NLIRO, supra note 16, at 112–14.
52 See id. at 36.
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extent of the damage and whether the buildings have wooden structures.53
The new system also provides a discount rate for residences with a high
earthquake-resistance capacity.54
b. Features of the Existing Insurance Policy
The existing earthquake insurance policy covers loss of or damage
to “building[s] for residential use and/or household and personal goods”
from “fire, destruction, burial or being carried away in a flood resulting di-
rectly or indirectly from an earthquake or volcanic eruption, or tsunami.”55
The insurance contract cannot be entered into independently and must be
incidental to the fire insurance coverage.56 One major difference between
earthquake insurance in Japan and similar insurance in North America
or Europe is that in Japan, fires following earthquakes are covered under
earthquake insurance rather than under fire insurance.57
Earthquake insurance can be contracted for a “short term, one year
[or] long term (two to five years).”58 The amount of earthquake insurance
ranges from thirty percent to fifty percent of the amount of fire insurance,
with an upper limit of 50 million yen (642 thousand USD) for buildings and
10 million yen (132 thousand USD) for home contents.59 The insurance
scheme provides complete coverage in the event of total loss, fifty percent
of the amount insured in the event of half loss, and only five percent of the
amount insured in the event of partial loss.60 This limited coverage is
considered problematic.
53 See id. at 42–43.
54 See id. at 36–37.
55 The Law Concerning Earthquake Insurance, art. 2, para. 2, (1)–(2).
56 This was done to prevent the danger of adverse selection. See Imai, supra note 17, at 64.
57 Tsubokawa, supra note 47, at 155. By contrast, in the U.S., a fire caused by an earth-
quake is covered under the fire insurance policy. Thus, in the U.S., a homeowner can col-
lect damages from an earthquake-caused fire even without buying earthquake insurance.
For example, in the 1906 San Francisco earthquake, “most of the damage was caused by fire,
and [fire] insurers were obligated to cover these losses.” Howard Kunreuther, Catastrophe
Insurance: Challenges for the US and Asia, in ASIAN CATASTROPHE INSURANCE 3, 18 (Charles
Scawthorn & Kiyoshi Kobayashi eds., 2008).
58 JAPAN EARTHQUAKE REINSURANCE CO., ANNUAL REPORT 2010—INTRODUCTION TO
EARTHQUAKE REINSURANCE IN JAPAN 3 (2010), available at http://fulltextreports.com
/2011/03/16/annual-report-2010-introduction-to-earthquake-reinsurance-in-japan/.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 4.
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The premium rate for earthquake insurance is calculated by the
Non–Life Insurance Rating Organization of Japan (“NLIRO”).61 NLIRO
is a non-profit private organization established under the Law Concerning
Non–Life Insurance Rating Organizations (“Rating Organization Law”)
and supervised by the Financial Services Agency.62 NLIRO can “calculate
‘reference loss cost rates’ (advisory pure risk premium rates) for fire in-
surance, personal accident insurance, automobile insurance, and nursing
care payments insurance.”63 It can also calculate “ ‘standard full rates’
(advisory premium rates) for compulsory automobile liability insurance
(CALI) and earthquake insurance.”64 The Rating Organization Law was
revised in 1951, and at that time, members were obliged to use the rates
calculated by the Organization, which at that point was called the Property
and Casualty Insurance Organization.65 This requirement was abolished
in a later revision.66
Today, insurers are free to follow NLIRO’s advice or to ignore it. In
practice, however the recommendations provided by NLIRO have a large
impact, essentially de facto setting the rates that will be charged.67 The
premium rate contains both a risk premium rate, based on the actuarial
premium, and a loading rate, based on the expenses of operating the earth-
quake insurance, the paperwork costs, and adjustment costs.68 According
to the Law Concerning Earthquake Insurance, the premium shall be as low
as possible while maintaining equilibrium between income and expenses.69
Two kinds of premium rates are set by NLIRO: the basic rate and
the discount rate.70 The basic rate consists of a risk premium rate and a
loading premium rate. As severe earthquakes are a low-frequency, high-
magnitude risk, the risk premium for earthquake insurance needs to be
considered over the long term. NLIRO sets rates, at the equilibrium level,
61 See NLIRO, supra note 16, at 51.
62 THE INSTITUTE OF ACTUARIES OF JAPAN, Non–Life Insurance in Japan—Automobile
Insurance & Fire Insurance 13 (Nov. 18, 2009), http://www.casact.org/education/annual
/2009/handouts/c16-tanaka.pdf.
63 Nobuyoshi Yamori & Taishi Okada, The Japanese Insurance Market and Companies:
Recent Trends, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE: BETWEEN GLOBAL DYNAMICS
AND LOCAL CONTINGENCIES 147, 201 (J. David Cummins & Bertrand Venard eds., 2007).
64 Id.
65 NOBORU KOBAYASHI ET AL., INSURANCE LAW IN JAPAN 76 (2010).
66 Id.
67 Telephone Interview with Mr. Kuni Shimada, Principal International Policy Coordinator,
Global Environment Bureau, Ministry of Environment (Japan) (Dec. 26, 2011) [hereinafter
Shimada Interview].
68 See NLIRO, supra note 16, at 53.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 36.
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based upon “375 destructive earthquakes that had happened over a period
of 506 years from 1494 to 1999.”71 The location and structural composition
of a residential building affects its premium rate, based on how well it could
withstand an earthquake.72 Japan’s prefectures are now divided into seven
categories, based on earthquake risk, that form the foundation for location-
based calculations.
TABLE 2: ANNUAL INSURANCE PREMIUM/AMOUNT INSURED73
As this Table shows, the basic premium is risk-related, depending
on the nature of the building and on its location. The highest construction-
based premium is applied to wooden buildings, as they are considered to
be most exposed to the risk of destruction in an earthquake.74 A premium
71 HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE: BETWEEN GLOBAL DYNAMICS AND LOCAL
CONTINGENCIES, supra note 63, at 192.
72 See JAPAN EARTHQUAKE REINSURANCE CO., supra note 58, at 5.
73 Id. at 6.
74 See NLIRO, supra note 16, at 42.
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reduction is awarded for the non-wooden buildings, or for wooden buildings
that incorporate risk reducing measures.75 For example, if the building is
a seismic isolated building constructed according to applicable laws, a dis-
count rate of thirty percent applies.76 If the building corresponds to the
earthquake-resistance class as described by law, a discount from ten per-
cent to thirty percent can be used.77 Besides, if an earthquake-resistance
diagnosis shows the building has an earthquake resistance capacity equiv-
alent to that stipulated by laws or the building was constructed during or
after June 1981, a discount of ten percent applies.78 Additionally, the pre-
mium is related to the location of the building. The higher the earthquake
risk in a particular region, the higher the premium will be.79 The result is
a fully risk-based system where the highest premiums are assigned to high-
risk buildings in high-risk areas, the lowest to low-risk buildings in low-
risk areas, with a sliding scale in between based on the interplay between
geographic and construction factors.
c. The Reinsurance Scheme
Earthquake risks are correlated with high potential losses. This cre-
ates challenges for private insurance markets to provide insurance cover-
age. The Japanese system chooses government-supported reinsurance to
make the earthquake risks insurable. To provide government-supported
reinsurance, the Japan Earthquake Reinsurance Company (“JER”) was
established in 1966.80 This system is described below.
First, private insurance companies selling earthquake insurance in
Japan enter into an Earthquake Reinsurance Agreement (“Agreement A”)
with the JER.81 According to Agreement A, the JER provides reinsurance
coverage for full liability of all earthquake insurance contracts.82 The rein-
surance terms are determined according to the latest risk-exposure analysis
and prices determined by the government. The price is not market-based,
75 See id.
76 See id. at 41–42.
77 The earthquake resistance class is identified in earthquake resistance capacity certificates.
The certificates are issued by designated organizations set forth in the Quality Guarantee
Law or the Building Standards Law. Id. at 42.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 42–43.
80 Janet L. Kaminski Leduc, Insurance and Financial Assistance for Natural Catastrophes
in the United States and Other Countries, OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH (Feb. 4, 2009),
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2009/rpt/2009-R-0010.htm.
81 Id.
82 JAPAN EARTHQUAKE REINSURANCE CO., supra note 58, at 10.
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but considers a general fair-value principle.83 For example, the rate should
be sustainable whether the government subsidizes it or the private rein-
surance market becomes unstable.84
Second, the JER retains parts of the risks it undertook from
Agreement A. JER can retrocede part of the risk to various private in-
surance companies, including the primary insurance companies and Toa
Reinsurance Co., Ltd. (“Toa Re”) under a separate reinsurance agree-
ment (“Agreement B”).85 This means that partial risk spreading takes
place between the reinsurer (JER) and private insurers, because the
private insurers will in turn partially reinsure the earthquake risk run
by JER.86
Third, JER can obtain reinsurance from the government to cede
part of the risk it undertook under Agreement A. This reinsurance agree-
ment with the government is referred to as “Excess of Loss Reinsurance”
(“Agreement C”).87 Under this agreement, reinsurance claims are paid if
the total payment of insurance claims caused by a single earthquake ex-
ceeds a benchmark amount.88 Systematically, the earthquake reinsurance
for earthquakes in Japan can be summarized as follows:
TABLE 3: EARTHQUAKE REINSURANCE IN JAPAN89
Risk covered
by JERC
JERC
83 CATASTROPHE RISKS AND REINSURANCE: A COUNTRY RISK MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE,
supra note 27, at 231.
84 Id.
85 NLIRO, supra note 16, at 45–46.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Nobuyoshi Yamori & Takeshi Kobayashi, Do Japanese Insurers Benefit From a
Catastrophic Event? Market Reactions to the 1995 Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, 16 J.
JAPANESE AND INT’L ECON. 92, 98 (2002).
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According to the Law, there is an aggregate limit of reinsurance
coverage for each earthquake, and the amount is set by a decision of the
National Diet90 for each year.91 If the insurance claims made for a single
earthquake exceed this amount, the insurance companies shall be able to
reduce the payment correspondingly.92 This amount is set at 5.5 trillion yen
(70.6 billion USD) as of 2010.93 Liability for the first layer of 115 billion yen
(1.5 billion USD) is undertaken by JER.94 According to the Enforcement
Order, for the payment amount of 115 billion yen (1.5 billion USD) and up
to 1.925 trillion yen (25 billion USD) the insurance companies (including
the JER and other private insurers)95 and the government shall each bear
fifty percent of the payment of insurance claims.96 For amounts exceeding
1.925 trillion yen, the government shall bear ninety-five percent and the
insurance companies shall bear the remaining five percent of payments.97
The total existing reinsurance scheme is illustrated below.
TABLE 4: EARTHQUAKE REINSURANCE SCHEME98
90 The Diet is the name of the national parliament in Japan. NIHONKOKU KENP [KENP]
[CONSTITUTION], art. 41 (Japan), available at http://www.shugiin.go.jp/itdb_english.nsf
/html/kenpou/english/constitution.htm.
91 The Law Concerning Earthquake Insurance, art. 3.
92 Id. at art. 4.
93 JAPAN EARTHQUAKE REINSURANCE CO., supra note 58, at 12.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 JAPAN EARTHQUAKE REINSURANCE CO., supra note 58, at 12.
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TABLE 5: THE LIABILITY LIMIT FOR JER, PRIVATE INSURERS AND THE
GOVERNMENT99
JER 605.60 billion yen
Non-life insurance companies 593.15 billion yen
The government 4,301.25 billion yen
Total
(limit amount of payable insurance claims)
5.50 trillion yen
The coverage for earthquake-related damage in Japan can hence be
characterized as a multilayered approach, with different responsibilities
of private insurance companies, the reinsurer JER, and the government.
The government responsibilities increase as the damage amount increases.
Even in a country with high earthquake risks like Japan, the fre-
quency of earthquake disasters is still low. It is difficult to predict when
such a disaster will happen in the near future.100 Hence the Regulation re-
quires insurance companies to set aside a “net pure premium,” premium
income minus operating expenses, as underwriting reserves.101 JER and
the government are also required to save risk reserves. All the investment
profits are also saved liability reserves.102 The government’s liability re-
serves, the reinsurance premiums and the investment profits, are accu-
mulated separately from general accounting under the Law Concerning
Special Accounts.103 Different insurance companies accumulate the in-
surance premiums and corresponding investment profits as liability re-
serves.104 For the private insurance companies, primary insurers and the
Toa Re, the liability reserves consist of their retrocession premiums.105 They
must deposit the whole amount of retrocession premiums with the JER,
which then invests the funds on their behalf.106 JER manages these re-
serves so as to promote a quick payment. The balance of risk reserves held
99 Id.
100 Regulation for Enforcing the Law Concerning Earthquake Insurance, art. 7.
101 Id.
102 See NLIRO, supra note 16, at 47.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Masao Wakuri & Yasuyuki Yasuhara, Earthquake Insurance in Japan, 9 ASTIN BULLETIN
329, 350 (1977), available at http://www.actuaries.org/LIBRARY/ASTIN/vol9no3/vol9no3.pdf.
106 Id. at 323–24.
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by JER, private insurance companies, and the government at the end of
fiscal year 2011 was:
TABLE 6: LIABILITY RESERVES107
JER 496.7 billion yen
Non-life insurance companies 524.3 billion yen
The government 1,270.8 billion yen
Total 2,291.9 billion yen
According to the General Insurance Association of Japan (“GIAJ”),
private insurers have paid 1.18 trillion yen (15 billion USD) for residential
damage through November 2011 for damage resulting from the Thoku
earthquake.108 The reserves of this insurance system are higher than the
estimated insured losses for residences for the Thoku earthquake.109 How-
ever, this estimate was based on a low penetration rate of earthquake
insurance into the market.110 According to the Japanese Cabinet Office, the
current estimated damage to buildings caused by the March 2011 earth-
quake and tsunami is about 10.4 trillion yen (153 billion USD).111 It is still
not clear whether the insurance system has sufficient capacity to compen-
sate for the whole damage if the penetration rate is high.
2. Earthquake Insurance for Households Provided by
Cooperative Insurers
The above section outlined the insurance system established under
the Law Concerning Earthquake Insurance. Under that system, earth-
quake insurance is provided by primary private insurers and is reinsured
by the government. A second system of insurance available in Japan, which
107 JAPAN EARTHQUAKE REINSURANCE CO., supra note 58, at 13.
108 Key Figures Related to Insurance Claims Due to the Earthquakes and Tsunamis in
Eastern Japan, GEN. INS. ASS’N OF JAPAN (Jan. 10, 2012), http://www.sonpo.or.jp/en/news
/2011/1111_01.html.
109 See OLIVIER MAHUL & EMILY WHITE, WORLD BANK, KNOWLEDGE NOTE 6-2: EARTHQUAKE
RISK INSURANCE 9 (2012), available at http://wbi.worldbank.org/wbi/Data/wbi/wbicms/files
/drupal-acquia/wbi/drm_kn6-2.pdf.
110 Id. at 4.
111 DEP’T OF INT’L AFFAIRS OF JAPAN SCI. & TECH. AGENCY, THE GREAT EAST JAPAN
EARTHQUAKE INFORMATION FROM OFFICIAL WEBSITES 16 (July 20, 2011), available at
http://www.jst.go.jp/pr/pdf/great_east_japan_earthquake.pdf.
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is not covered by the Law Concerning Earthquake Insurance, is provided
by cooperative insurers known as Kyosai.112 “Kyosai is considered to be
a scheme formed by residents in the same region or persons engaged in
the same occupation, which provides a certain amount of benefits from the
pooled financial contributions of the membership for disaster, death or
accident.”113 Kyosai provide the bulk of Japanese household coverage.114
In 2008, Kyosai issued over thirty-four million policies, compared to ten
million issued by private insurers.115 The largest Kyosai is the National
Mutual Insurance Federation of Agricultural Cooperatives (“Zenkyoren”),
which accumulates approximately eighty-five percent of the total coopera-
tive insurer’s fire insurance premium.116
Unlike the insurance provided by private insurers, which is at-
tached to the fire insurance policy, Zenkyoren’s residential earthquake
exposure comes “primarily from its building endowment policy.”117 The
building endowment policy is provided on a five-year basis or longer, and
it “automatically covers residential buildings and property from damages
caused by fire, flood, earthquakes and other disasters.”118 In addition to
property damage, this coverage also extends to personal injury and death
caused by a natural disaster.119
The Kyosai are non-profit organizations. However, the premiums
they charge are higher than the total losses they expect to pay after disas-
ters. This enables them to accumulate a substantial premium income.120
Most of the premium income is set aside as liability reserves. Because of
this, the endowment policy can be considered a long-term savings policy
that funds essential home repairs.121 In addition to covering natural disas-
ter induced loss, a Kyosai policy provides a partial refund of premium to
pay for essential home repairs, such as fixing a leaking roof.122 A partial
112 See About Unregulated Kyosai, FIN. SERVICES AGENCY (2012), http://www.fsa.go.jp/en
/refer/ins/kyosai.html.
113 Id.
114 Georgina Crowhurst & Garrett Moore, The Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami, 19 ENVTL.
LIABILITY 23, 25 (2011).
115 Id. at 25.
116 See Sean McAllister & Elizabeth Cohen, Japanese Casualty Insurers Show Resilience,
CONTINGENCIES, Sep./Oct. 2011, at 68.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 “According to an A.M. Best ranking of international insurance companies, Zenkyoren
ranked seventh in the world in terms of net written premium in 2009.” Id. at 72.
121 McAllister & Cohen, supra note 116, at 68.
122 Id.
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refund will also be provided if the policy expires without claiming a total
loss.123 The policy provided by Kyosai provides all-hazard coverage.124 Hence
the “earthquake component of the building endowment rate is not segre-
gated from the total rate and does not vary by location.”125
Instead of being reinsured by the government, the insurance pro-
vided by Kyosai is reinsured by the international reinsurance market. It
is reported that Zenkyoren purchases “one of the world’s largest catastro-
phe reinsurance programmes, placed predominantly in the London and
Bermuda markets.”126 A preliminary loss estimate shows that Zenkyoren
may suffer a loss of 650 billion yen (8.3 billion USD) from its building en-
dowment policies as a result of the March 11 earthquake and tsunami.127
It is expected to cede 380 billion yen (4.6 billion USD) to international rein-
surers and retain 270 billion yen (3.3 billion USD).128 In addition to the use
of reinsurance, Zenkyoren also uses catastrophic bonds to distribute risk
throughout the market.129 The use of catastrophic bonds will be discussed
later in this Article.
B. Compensation for Commercial and Industrial Losses in Case
of Earthquake
Unlike earthquake insurance for residences, earthquake insur-
ance for business and industry is operated in the private market without
government’s direct support. Earthquake insurance for commercial and
industrial losses began to develop in 1956.130 This policy often takes the
form of fire insurance and extended perils.131 Earthquake coverage is not
123 Id.
124 See id. at 72.
125 Id. at 68.
126 Crowhurst & Moore, supra note 114, at 25.
127 See McAllister & Cohen, supra note 116, at 70.
128 Id.
129 For example, Zenkyoren was the ultimate beneficiary of the Muteki CAT bond, a $300
million bond issued by Munich Re in 2008. The Muteki CAT bond provided fully collat-
eralized protection for Japanese earthquake exposure, and is the first catastrophic bond
that resulted in a total loss of principal. Id. at 70.
130 AON RISK SOLUTIONS, JAPAN EARTHQUAKE COVERAGE: INSURANCE POLICY OVERVIEW
1 (2011), available at http://www.oesa.org/Doc-Vault/Industry-Information-Analysis/Japan
-Earthquake-Information/AON-Japan-Earthquake-Coverage-Insurance-Policy-Overview
-Mar-22.pdf.
131 See Crowhurst & Moore, supra note 114, at 26.
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automatically included in the standard policies but is available through
“endorsements,” or upgrades to the regular policy.132 These endorsements
come in several forms: earthquake coverage endorsement, which “covers
loss or damage caused by fire following earthquake and destruction or bury-
ing caused by earthquake”; earthquake bursting and explosion coverage,
which “covers loss or damage caused by a sudden explosion of gas or vapor
caused by earthquake”; earthquake water damage coverage, which “covers
loss or damage caused by water perils” and earthquake shock exclusion
endorsement which “excludes earthquake shock damage.”133
To tailor risk premiums, insurers divide Japan into twelve zones
for cover limits and seven risk exposure zones.134 The premium rate is set
according to the “structure of the building insured (five classes) and risk
exposure (seven zones).”135 The insurance contracts often contain different
deductibles and sublimits, such as percentage deductibles and sublimits
specific to “unit of insurance,” contingent business interruption deduct-
ibles, waiting periods, and so on.136 To respond to potential catastrophes,
the insurers for commercial and industrial risks are also required to set
aside reserves with a minimum level of two percent of the annual line
net premiums.137
In addition to coverage for property damage that directly results
from the earthquake, business interruption insurance is also relevant.
Instead of reinsurance by the government, earthquake insurance for in-
dustrial and commercial risks is reinsured in the international market.138
Generally, commercial earthquake risks are reinsured “under 60–70
percent quota share treaties in the international reinsurance markets.”139
132 Id.
133 AON RISK SOLUTIONS, supra note 130.
134 RICHARD ROTH, FOREIGN EARTHQUAKE INSURANCE PROGRAMS 20 (1999), available at
http://www.iclr.org/images/Foreign_Earthquake_Insurance.pdf.
135 Id.
136 AON RISK SOLUTIONS, supra note 130, at 4–5. Sublimits subject to “unit of insurance”
means that under such a policy, “[b]uilding, [b]usiness [p]ersonal [p]roperty and [t]ime
[e]lement[s] . . . may all have separate deductibles and sublimits.” Id. at 4. Contingent
business interruption deductibles “may include the business interruption values at in-
sured locations affected by the loss.” Id. at 5. Waiting periods can be used as “qualifiers,”
which means no coverage is provided “until a business is interrupted in excess of the stated
‘qualifying’ period of time.” Id. With contingent business interruption deductibles, the loss
is calculated from when the loss began, whereas with waiting periods, the loss is calculated
from the time that the waiting period is eclipsed. See id. at 4–5.
137 See Roth, supra note 134, at 21.
138 See Crowhurst & Moore, supra note 114, at 26.
139 Id.
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The reinsurance capacity is limited. In this case, the capital market
can be used as an alternative to improve the insurance capacity. One highly
popular instrument in this respect is the catastrophe bond (“cat bond”).140
Cat bonds evolved as an alternative to reinsurance in the 1990s.141 When
a cat bond is issued by an insurer, the “investors pay the principal amount
to a ‘special-purpose vehicle’ (“SPV”), which acts as a clearing institution.”142
If the trigger event occurs, the insurer is exempted from its obligation to
pay interest or a fraction of the principal.143 In exchange for assuming this
risk, investors benefit from a higher promised interest on their bond.144
In Japan, several insurers have issued cat bonds to transfer some
of the financial risk caused by earthquakes, since the first issue in 1997.145
It is worth noting that the international insurance market participates not
only in the insurance for commercial and industrial risks but also in the
insurance for households provided by cooperative insurers. Therefore, cat
bonds can be relevant for both kinds of insurance. It is estimated that there
are more than 1.7 billion USD in cat bonds that are potentially affected by
the Japanese earthquake.146 Because of the different structure of those
bonds, the extent to which they will lead to a loss to the investors still re-
mains to be seen. Until now, only one cat bond is “expected to experience
a full loss.”147 It is Muteki Ltd. Series 2008-1, a bond issued by Muteki
Ltd., which Munich Re structured for the Japanese carrier Zenkyoren.148
C. Other Insurance Policies
As discussed earlier, insurance policies are not only available for
households and commercial/industrial risks. Some other insurance poli-
cies are also relevant in case of an earthquake, such as personal accident/
140 See Silke Finken & Christian Laux, Catastrophe Bonds and Reinsurance: The Competitive
Effect of Information-Insensitive Triggers, 76 J. RISK & INS. 579, 580 (2009).
141 Id. at 579–80.
142 Id. at 580. See also Veronique Bruggeman, Capital Market Instruments for Natural
Catastrophe and Terrorism Risks: A Bright Future?, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 10136, 10139 (2010).
143 Finken & Laux, supra note 140, at 580–81.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 580.
146 Sarah Mortimer, Cat Bond Investors Not Scared Off by Japan Quake, INS. J. (May 16,
2011), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/international/2011/05/16/198576.htm.
147 Id.
148 Id.; see also Moody’s Downgrades Muteki Ltd. Series 2008-1, a Catastrophe Bond
Program Exposed to Japan Earthquake, MOODY’S (Mar. 31, 2011), http://www.moodys.com
/research/Moodys-downgrades-Muteki-Ltd-Series-2008-1-a-catastrophe-bond--PR_216840.
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life insurance, business interruption insurance, motor insurance, and
marine insurance.149
Personal accident policies typically cover death, permanent dis-
ability and hospitalization.150 However, death and personal injury result-
ing from an earthquake or tsunamis are “only written by endorsement,
for an additional premium.”151 Eqecat estimated the life insurance losses
as a result of the Thoku earthquake of March 11 to be in the range of 2
to 3 billion USD.152
Business interruption insurance is another category affected by
an earthquake. Usually, if there is “initial physical loss or damage to the
insured,” coverage is available for the incidental interruption to the in-
sured’s electricity, gas, and other utility services.153 A related policy is a
Contingent Business Interruption (“CBI”) policy. It covers losses to the
insured caused by physical damage to a supplier and his client.154
Motor vehicle insurance is one of the most important non–life
insurance policies in Japan. It consists of a required basic third-party lia-
bility automobile insurance and voluntary motor vehicle insurance, which
covers third party property damage, own damage and personal accidents.155
It is worth noting that “losses arising out of an earthquake or tsunami are
usually excluded and available only by way of endorsement.”156
Marine insurance is also relevant because an earthquake and tsu-
nami can damage ships, cargo, piers, and wharves.157 The damage covered
by marine insurance is estimated to be in the range of 1 to 3 billion USD
as a result of the 2011 earthquake.158 Different types of marine insurance
exist in Japan. Damage to ships caused by a tsunami is covered by hull
insurance.159 For the ships’ cargo, coverage is divided into two categories,
both of which are involved in the insurance market: inland transit and
ocean marine insurance.160 Under the clauses which govern coastal cargo
149 Crowhurst & Moore, supra note 114, at 24.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id. (“This estimate is based on average life insurance policy limits of approximately
$360,000, while assuming 10,000 people either dead or missing.”).
153 Id.
154 Id. at 24–25.
155 Crowhurst & Moore, supra note 114, at 26.
156 Id.
157 See id.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 27.
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transit and transport, “earthquake losses for shipments on land are usu-
ally excluded.”161 For the insurance of marine cargo, there has been a
shift from the Institute Cargo Clauses of 1963 to the new Institute Cargo
Clauses of 2009, which come in three categories: A, B or C Clauses.162
The cargo covered under the “all risks” A or B Clauses are also covered
against earthquake-related risks.163 But for coverage under the C Clauses,
“there is no insurance for earthquake-related losses.”164
D. Government Support and Local Mutual Funds
The previous section discussed the use of insurance to cover earth-
quake damage, with a focus on insurance for households. In spite of the
availability of a variety of products, the earthquake insurance system in
Japan is not compulsory, and the rate of market penetration is not very
high. A study indicates that recently, in five areas with a higher probabil-
ity of an earthquake occurring within the next thirty years, the percentage
of households covered by private earthquake insurance varies from 24.6
percent to 27.95 percent.165 This means that on average only one quarter
of residences exposed to an earthquake risk have insurance coverage.166
This means three out of four residences are not covered by insurance. This
indicates that without mandatory coverage requirements, insurance alone
can not provide sufficient compensation and recovery after an earthquake
disaster to the wide range of victims affected.
As a country with a serious risk of natural disasters, Japan has es-
tablished a comprehensive system of public support for disaster victims.
161 Crowhurst & Moore, supra note 114, at 27.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 The JER’s 2010 report shows the percentage of households purchasing earthquake
insurance in areas at risk of major earthquakes. JAPAN EARTHQUAKE REINSURANCE CO.,
supra note 58, at 14. The report identifies the five areas as follows: Kanto, metropolitan
Tokyo, Tokai, Tonankai, and Nankai. Id. According to the 2010 version of the National
Seismic Hazard Maps provided by the Headquarters for Earthquake Research Promotion
of the Japanese government, the probability of an earthquake occurring in any one of these
five areas in the next 30 years is respectively: 0–1%, 70%, 87%, 60–70%, and 60%. Id. The
percentage of households with insurance, respectively: 26.83%, 27.52%, 27.95%, 25.86%,
and 24.60%. Id.
166 This number, however, only concerns households that are insured by private insurers;
insurance is also provided by the Kyosai, which may increase the coverage, but still cover-
age remains low. See JAPAN EARTHQUAKE REINSURANCE CO., supra note 58, at 14; see also
FINANCIAL SERVICES AGENCY, supra note 112.
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Provisions include economic support for livelihood, house provision and
reconstruction, as well as support for small- and medium-sized enterprises
and the self-employed.167 Support can take the form of a monetary grant,
subsidized loans, publicly provided housing and so on. In addition to the
national public support system, several local governments have also intro-
duced their own housing recovery systems.168 One example is the Mutual
Housing Recovery Support System established in the Hyogo Prefecture in
2005.169 This section separately discusses the national public support and
the local mutual aid systems.
1. Government Support
In Japan, many methods can be employed to relieve individuals
and small enterprises from the significant influence of natural disasters
with post-disaster funding. Government support can be provided in differ-
ent ways: direct monetary support can be given to individuals or families
for their living expenses; support can be provided for repair and reconstruc-
tion of houses; and beyond support for the basic livelihood of individuals,
support can be also provided for business enterprises.170
The support provided can be either material or monetary. The
shelter, temporary houses, and urgent repair provided by the government
fall into the first category. The second category contains many different pro-
grams, such as monetary aid provided under the Act Concerning Support
for Reconstructing Livelihoods of Disaster Victims (Act No. 66),171 reduc-
tion or exemption of taxes and premiums for some public insurance, and
subsidized loans.172 A comprehensive and detailed introduction of all those
instruments is outside the scope of this Article, but a brief explanation will
be useful to better understand the compensation system currently in place.
167 See infra Part I.D.1.
168 See infra Part I.D.2.
169 See THE CLAUSE OF HYOGO MUTUAL AID PROGRAM FOR HOUSING RECONSTRUCTION
(2005), available at https://www.jutakusaiken.jp/000085979.pdf. For an English intro-
duction to this program, see Join Hyogo Mutual Aid Program for Housing Reconstruction,
14 ASHIYA NEWSLETTER (Mar. 1, 2006), http://www.city.ashiya.lg.jp/sankaku/kokusai
/documents/20060301.pdf.
170 A SUMMARY OF THE VARIOUS SUPPORTING REGIMES FOR VICTIMS, CABINET OFFICE
(June 30, 2012), available at http://www.bousai.go.jp/fukkou/kakusyuseido.pdf.
171 Hisaisha Seikatsu Saiken Shien Ho [Act Concerning Support for Reconstructing
Livelihoods of Disaster Victims], Law No. 66 of 1998 (Japan).
172 GUIDANCE ABOUT THE VARIOUS SUPPORTING REGIMES FOR CATASTROPHIC VICTIMS,
CABINET OFFICE, available at http://www.bousai.go.jp/hou/kentou/tyukan/sankou.pdf.
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The following laws and programs are discussed in this section:
support under the Disaster Relief Act, the Condolence Grant Program,
support for reconstructing the livelihoods of disaster victims, financial aid
for victims of major disasters, and the reconstruction fund.
a. Disaster Relief Act
The Disaster Relief Act stipulates the emergency measures the
government should carry out after a disaster occurs.173 The purpose of this
legislation is “to protect victims of disaster and maintain social order by
causing the Central Government to provide needed relief services on an
emergency basis in cooperation with Local Public Entities and the Red
Cross, other entities, and the people of Japan.”174 The relief provided under
the Disaster Relief Act is mainly in-kind support, such as the provision of
shelters, the provision of food through cooking, the provision of water, the
provision or lending of clothes, beds, and other necessities and so on.175
Monetary aid is only of secondary importance: it is provided only
when governors of prefectures deem it necessary.176 In case of a disaster,
the prefectural government needs to carry out relief activities. The pre-
fectures shall pay for the expenses of the relief activities. However, when
the expenses exceed a given proportion of the general tax revenues of the
prefecture, the national treasury shall pay from fifty to ninety percent of
the expenses.177
The Disaster Relief Act prescribes the emergency relief measures
that should be taken by government in case of a disaster. However, it is
limited to in-kind support. This limits where individuals can reside and
makes the reconstruction in new places difficult. Besides, the free provision
of temporary housing makes the residents reluctant to leave once they
have moved in.178
173 Saigai Kyujo Ho [Natural Disaster Victims Relief Act], Law No. 108 of 1947, art. I
(Japan).
174 Id.
175 Id. art. 23.
176 Id.
177 Id. art. 36.
178 Eiji Tajika & Takeshi Miyazaki, Disaster Relief and the Role of Fiscal Assistance—The
Case of the Niigata Chuetsu Earthquake, 91 FIN. REV. 22 (2008). The paper was presented
in English at the International Symposium on “5.12” Wenchuan Massive Earthquake
Restoration, Reconstruction and Catastrophe Response, available at http://www.sc.gov
.cn/zwgk/zwdt/bmdt/201009/t20100922_1032087.shtml.
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b. The Condolence Grant Program
Under the Act Concerning the Provision of Disaster Condolence
Grants, cash payment is provided to relieve the victims and family mem-
bers of deceased or seriously injured victims.179 It provides three kinds
of relief: grants to family members of the deceased, grants to the seri-
ously injured, and loans to disaster victims.180 The first program gives
relief payment to the family members of the deceased, with five million
yen (64,000 USD) for the death of heads-of-household and 2.5 million yen
(32,000 USD) for the death of other family members.181 In the event of
serious injury, a family can be paid 2.5 million yen (32,000 USD) for in-
jury to the head-of-household or 1.25 million yen (16,000 USD) for injury
to another family member.182 Municipalities are responsible for the pay-
ment of these grants. According to the act, one third of the expenses shall
be born by prefectures.183 The national government will pay two thirds
of the prefectures’ expenses.184
In addition to the direct grant, the government can also provide a
“loan as disaster aid fund.”185 If the head of a household is injured or a fam-
ily suffers damage to their house or household goods to an extent defined
by government orders, a loan can be provided.186 A grace period of three
years—which can under extraordinary situations be set at five years—
applies, and the loan must be repaid within ten years from the day of
borrowing.187 The national government bears two-thirds of the expenses
of this loan, while the prefectural government bears the remaining third.188
The Condolence Grant Act provides emergency financial support
to a limited number of persons in the form of a condolence grant or a low-
interest loan, which the borrowers are supposed to repay in three to five
years.189 However, defaults pose a problem in case of a major disaster. The
179 See DISASTER RELIEF AND SUPPORT FOR VICTIMS, MINISTRY OF HEALTH, LABOUR AND
WELFARE, available at http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/wp/wp-hw5/dl/23010813e.pdf.
180 Act on the Provision of Disaster Condolence Grants, Law No. 82 of 1973, art. 3 (Japan).
181 See DISASTER RELIEF AND SUPPORT FOR VICTIMS, supra note 179.
182 Id.
183 Aya Okada & Louise Comfort, “Black Swan” in Northeastern Japan: Interdependent
Systems, Escalating Disaster on March 11, 2011 17 (Graduate Sch. For Pub. & Int’l Affairs,
Working Paper No. 1201).
184 Id.
185 Tajika & Miyazaki, supra note 178.
186 See id.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Id.
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Kobe earthquake led to irrecoverable loans of up to 25.1 billion yen (321
million USD).190 Scholars argue that these defaults can provoke a sense
of unfairness among the debtors and create a moral hazard problem.191
Therefore, they call for a stringent review of the existing loan program.192
c. The Act Concerning Support for Reconstructing Livelihoods of
Disaster Victims
The Kobe earthquake in 1995 damaged a large number of houses.193
At the time, the penetration of earthquake insurance was low. The main
source for housing recovery up to the earthquake was donated money.194
In the case of Kobe, the total amount of donated money was large, but so
was the total number of victims; because of this, each household was given
only 257,070 yen (3300 USD).195 This clear inadequacy led to discussions
among “local government, various organizations, and political parties”
about “measures for supporting disaster victims in house reconstruction
and in restoring their lives.”196 In 1998, the Act Concerning Support for
Reconstructing Livelihoods of Disaster Victims (“Act No. 66”) was en-
acted.197 It provides financial support to any “disaster victim[] whose house
has been totally destroyed or who suffer similar damage.”198 The amount
of assistance should be no more than one million yen (13,000 USD) and
should be used for “purchasing household goods necessary for reconstruct-
ing their lives.”199
Although the Act started to provide a structural solution to the pro-
vision of financial support, instead of loans, Act No. 66 “was criticized for
the strict requirements for designation of the areas covered” and for the
low eligibility requirements as far as annual income was concerned.200 As
190 Id.
191 See Tajika & Miyazaki, supra note 178.
192 Id.
193 See NLIRO, supra note 16, at 71; see also Hiroo Kanamori, The Kobe (Hyogo-ken Nanbu),
Japan, Earthquake of January 16, 1995, 66 SEISMOLOGICAL RESEARCH LETTERS 6, 6 (1995),
available at http://mh-gps-p1.caltech.edu/uploads/File/People/kanamori/HKsrl95b.pdf.
194 Maki, supra note 28.
195 Id.
196 See NLIRO, supra note 16, at 71.
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 Id. The criticism referred to the fact that only those who had an income lower than a
particular threshold were eligible for compensation. Id.
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a result, many households were not eligible for financial support under the
Act. Act No. 66 was revised in 2004 and in 2007.201 Under the 2004 system,
financial aid is provided in an amount “not more than two million yen
(26,000 USD) for demolition expenses for rebuilding houses, house rents”
and other actual expenses, “in addition to the support already offered
under the old Act regarding living expenditures to be allocated for the pur-
chase of necessary contents.”202 The 2007 revision relaxed the requirements
for grant support and “adopted a flat-rate provision of financial support
according to the degree of house damage and the manner of house recon-
struction.”203 The financial aid provided falls into two categories: aid based
on the degree of damage to the house and aid based on the manner of re-
construction of the house.204 The aid provided under the first category could
be one million yen or half a million yen (6504 USD), depending on whether
the house is totally destroyed or largely destroyed.205 The aid provided
under the second category could be two million yen, one million yen, or half
a million yen, depending on the method of reconstruction.206 The use of
financial support was not restricted to a specific purpose, such as rebuild-
ing or renting, as required under the 2004 revisions.207
Under the existing financial aid system, the requirements regarding
the annual income and age of recipients have been abolished. Eligibility for
financial support is determined according to the specified geographic areas
which suffered from a certain disaster and the extent of damage suffered
by the victims.208 The aid can be provided up to three million yen (39,000
USD) per household, with three quarters that amount available to a single-
person household.209 Aid is still provided under two categories: aid based
on the degree of house damage and aid based on the manner of house re-
construction (construction or purchase, repair and house rent).210 Accord-
ing to the act, the prefectural government can authorize a supporting legal
person to distribute the financial aid.211 The prefectural government will
201 Id. at 72.
202 NLIRO, supra note 16, at 72.
203 Id. at 72–73.
204 Id. at 73.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Id. at 72–73.
208 NLIRO, supra note 16, at 73.
209 See id.
210 Id.
211 Act Concerning Support for Reconstructing Livelihoods of Disaster Victims, supra note
171, art. 4.
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finance the supporting legal person according to the mutual aid principle.212
In addition, the central government will provide half of the aid paid by the
support legal person if a greater fund is necessary.213 It is estimated that
by 2008, the reserve fund accumulated by the prefecture amounted to 113
billion yen (1.47 million USD).214 This has been criticized by scholars as
insufficient if a large-scale earthquake were to occur.215
The recent Thoku earthquake has proved the insufficiency of the
system. The cabinet office reported that the death toll from this earth-
quake was 15,843, and that 3809 persons were missing.216 It led to 118,480
houses totally destroyed and 182,825 houses half destroyed.217 The prop-
erty damage was estimated by the cabinet office to be 16,900 billion yen
(220 billion USD).218
d. The Law for Financial Aid for Major Disasters
In addition to direct payments to disaster victims, a system aim-
ing at reconstructing and recovering the economy also exists in Japan.
The systems for financial aid for major disasters and reconstruction funds
have this purpose.219 In case of a catastrophic disaster that “will inflict
a far-reaching and serious effect upon the national economy” and in the
event that “it is deemed necessary to alleviate the local financial burden
caused by the disaster or to provide special subsidies to the victims,” special
measures will be taken.220 Those measures are established under the Law
Concerning Special Financial Aid to Deal with Major Disasters (“Major
Disasters Law”).221 When a disaster is designated as a “major disaster”
according to the Major Disaster Designation Standard, special financial
aid can be disbursed to promote the recovery of public civil engineering
212 Id. art. 9.
213 Id. art. 18.
214 See Tajika & Miyazaki, supra note 178.
215 Id.
216 CABINET OFFICE, TOHOKU-PACIFIC OCEAN EARTHQUAKE (2011), available at http://www
.kantei.go.jp/saigai/pdf/201110041700jisin.pdf.
217 Id.
218 MOTOHIRO SATO & LAURA BOUDREAU, WORLD BANK, KNOWLEDGE NOTE 6-4: THE
FINANCIAL AND FISCAL IMPACTS 4 (2012), available at http://wbi.worldbank.org/wbi/Data
/wbi/wbicms/files/drupal-acquia/wbi/drm_kn6-4.pdf.
219 See Law Concerning Special Financial Aid to Deal with Major Disasters, Law No. 150
of 1962, art. 1 (Japan).
220 Tajika & Miyazaki, supra note 178.
221 Id.
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facilities.222 Special aid can also be provided for small- and medium-sized
enterprises and to the agricultural, forestry and fishery industries.223 The
available aid under this Act includes the national treasury’s share of the
expenses for projects to recover public civil engineering works, low inter-
est loans to the agricultural, forestry, and fishery industries, and credit
security for small- and medium-sized enterprises.224 The Major Disaster
Designation Standard is a nationwide standard.225 There may be situations
where an area suffers serious localized damage that does not have national
influence, and so cannot benefit from a major disaster designation. To deal
with these cases, the Localized Major Disaster Designation Standard was
also set up.226
e. The Reconstruction Fund
The reconstruction fund is also frequently used to supplement the
government’s efforts in case of a major disaster. For example, after both
the Kobe earthquake of 1995 and the Niigata Chuetsu earthquake of 2004,
a reconstruction fund was established with the aim to “supplement the
existing reconstruction measures in post-disaster recovery, carry out re-
lief activities for and help the self-reliance of disaster victims, and facili-
tate steadily and dynamically comprehensive reconstruction measures
in disaster-stricken areas from a long-term perspective.”227 The recon-
struction fund can be used to provide socioeconomic rehabilitation aids
for victims, provide housing aid, support industries such as agriculture,
forestry and fishery.228
A reconstruction fund works as follows: the prefectural government
borrows money by issuing bonds from banks and makes a loan to the re-
construction fund.229 The national government pays the interest with tax
grants; this amount will be deducted from the annual tax grants to the pre-
fecture in the following years.230 The prefectural government then lends
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 Tajika & Miyazaki, supra note 178.
227 Id.
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 Id. Under the Japanese system, the national government makes financial transfer to
prefectures and municipalities through tax grants every year to protect the autonomy of
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this without interest.231 The fund then “uses the loan from the prefecture
to buy loan claims owned by the banks.”232 The money actually transferred
is the interest for the debt. In other words, the principle of the fund comes
from the amount provided by the national government.233
2. Local Mutual Support Funds
Some prefecture governments have also established a housing
recovery support system.234 Many of those systems simply complement
the national system.235 The Hyogo Prefecture established a different sup-
port system.236 Having been severely affected by the Kobe earthquake,
the Hyogo Prefecture created a house rehabilitation mutual aid system in
2005.237 It enacted the Regulation on the Mutual Aid Program for Hous-
ing Reconstruction and the corresponding Clause of Mutual Aid Program
for Housing Reconstruction in 2005.238 The Mutual Aid System for Hous-
ing Reconstruction (“Housing System”) provides relief to victims who
suffer from “storms, heavy rain, heavy snow, flooding . . . earthquakes,
tsunami, [volcanic] eruptions or any other disaster caused by abnormal
natural phenomena.”239 It is a kind of mutual insurance system, run by
the local government.
Participation in this system is voluntary, and contributions are
fixed. All people who live in the Hyogo Prefecture, whether they own
or rent, can participate in the system.240 At the time the system was es-
tablished, the annual premium was 5000 yen (64 USD).241 Relief can be
paid if the member suffers total or partial damage to her house. Relief is
available up to 6 million yen (77,000 USD), depending on the extent of
the local areas and balance the finances of different areas. See NOBUKI MOCHIDA, WORLD
BANK INSTITUTE, TAXES AND TRANSFERS IN JAPAN’S LOCAL PUBLIC FINANCES 2–4 (2001),
available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/WBI/Resources/wbi37171.pdf.
231 Tajika & Miyazaki, supra note 178.
232 Id.
233 Id.
234 See Maki, supra note 28.
235 Id.
236 Id.
237 Id.
238 HYOGO PREFECTURE, supra note 28, at 7.
239 Id.
240 Id.
241 Id. at 2.
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damage and whether the victim needs to reconstruct, purchase, or repair
the house.242
In 2010, a similar mutual aid clause was established for household
goods.243 Under that system, a premium up to 1500 yen (19 USD) can pur-
chase coverage up to 500,000 yen (6418 USD).244 The Mutual Aid System
for Household Articles Restoration (“Household Articles System”) is in-
dependent from the mutual aid system for residences.245 However, if a
member already participates in the Housing System, then his contribu-
tion to the Household Articles system is discounted (1000 yen [13 USD]
per year).246 The penetration rate of this system is still low. The Hyogo
Prefecture reports that the rate of participation in the mutual aid system
for houses in 2010 is only eight percent, while that for household goods
is 1.6 percent.247
E. Evaluation
1. Risk Differentiation
A positive aspect of the insurance system in Japan is undoubtedly
that premiums are risk-related. As discussed above,248 recommendations
on premiums by NLIRO are differentiated on the basis of the location and
on the basis of the construction material used.249 However, a problematic
aspect is that in practice, the recommendations by NLIRO are automati-
cally transposed into premiums by the commercial insurers.250 These types
of recommendations limit competition.251 Moreover, the risk differentia-
tion only applies to earthquake insurance offered by private insurance com-
panies. The Kyosai provide all-inclusive insurance, including earthquake
coverage, that does not vary by location and lacks the mitigation incentives
that stem from risk differentiation.252
242 Id.
243 Id. at 9.
244 HYOGO PREFECTURE, supra note 28, at 2.
245 Id.
246 Id. at 5.
247 Noting that the Household Articles System was only established in 2010. See http://web
.pref.hyogo.jp/contents/000186201.pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2012).
248 See JAPAN EARTHQUAKE REINSURANCE CO., supra note 58, at 5.
249 Id.
250 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
251 See Michael Faure & Roger Van den Bergh, Restrictions of Competition on Insurance
Markets and the Applicability of EC Anti-Trust Law, 48 KYKLOS 65 (1995).
252 See supra Part I.A.2.
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There seems to be an adequate supply of different earthquake in-
surance mechanisms. Individuals seeking coverage for earthquake risks
can choose between commercial private insurers, the Kyosai, and in some
cases local mutual funds. In principle, potential victims wishing to seek in-
surance coverage in Japan can choose from a large variety of options.253
However, a problem may arise from the fact that there is little competi-
tion between the various insurers, an issue exacerbated by the fact that
the Japanese insurance market is still relatively closed to penetration by
foreign insurers.254 Only insurance companies operating via internet would
offer lower rates, but since trust and credibility are very important in
Japanese society there may be a reluctance to purchase earthquake
insurance over the internet.255
2. Remaining Inefficiencies
In spite of the positive aspects of the catastrophic insurance system
in Japan, there are still some inefficiencies in this system. The literature
has shown some problems in the household insurance provided by private
insurers. Indeed, the penetration rate of earthquake insurance for house-
holds provided by private insurers is still low.256 This can be attributed to
three factors. First, many people tend to underestimate the earthquake
risks. When facing low-frequency, high-magnitude risks, people tend to as-
sume that “[i]t will not happen to me,” and do not have sufficient incen-
tives to buy insurance or take mitigation measures.257 A sudden rise in
insurance participation rates following a major earthquake reflects the
underestimation of earthquake risk.258 After the 1995 Kobe earthquake,
253 Shimada Interview, supra note 67.
254 Id.
255 Id.
256 According to NLIRO, the average proportion of fire insurance policies with the attachment
of earthquake insurance in 2011 in Japan was 53.7%. See NLIRO, TREND OF EARTHQUAKE
INSURANCE ATTACHMENT RATE BY PREFECTURE (2011), available at http://www.nliro.or.jp
/english/pdf/data/e_data10.pdf. The penetration rate when considering only households is
even lower. According to JER, as of 2011, this rate is 23.7%. See JAPANESE EARTHQUAKE
REINSURANCE CO., http://www.nihonjishin.co.jp/topics/t110829.pdf (last visited Nov. 2,
2012). These numbers show that in general (looking at commercial risks and Household
Insurance) the earthquake coverage is limited (48.1%), but that this number is even lower
when only households are considered (23.7%).
257 See Kunreuther, supra note 57, at 9; Pierre Picard, Natural Disaster Insurance and the
Equity-Efficiency Tradeoff, 75 J. RISK & INS. 17 (2008).
258 RISK MANAGEMENT SOLUTIONS, 1995 KOBE EARTHQUAKE 10-YEAR RETROSPECTIVE 9,
available at http://www.rms.com/publications/KobeRetro.pdf.
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the penetration rate of earthquake insurance was seven percent in the
whole country, and three percent in Hyogo Prefecture, the epicenter of the
earthquake.259 Immediately after the disaster, “the demand for earthquake
cover doubled to 15 percent of Japanese households.”260
A second reason for the low penetration of earthquake insurance
is the lack of trust in Japan’s earthquake insurance system. The strict
conditions mandated for insurance payment, differing assessments of the
damage by policyholders and insurers, and newspaper reports about non-
payment by insurers all contribute to the distrust of households.261 Some
scholars attribute the ambiguity of insurance payments to the informa-
tion asymmetry between policyholders and insurers, as well as the lack
of experience on both sides of the transaction that results from the rarity
of earthquakes.262
A third reason is the adverse selection problem. A certain level of
risk differentiation has been achieved in the premium setting. The basic
rating is set according to the structure of the building and the location of
the insured households.263 A discount rate can be granted if some risk re-
sistant measures are taken.264 However, this system of premium setting
is still criticized by some scholars as insufficient.265 A uniform community
rating system has been adopted in Japan. The estimate of earthquake risks
and correspondingly, the premiums, are computed at the geographical level
of the prefectures.266 Each prefecture is then classified into one of the rat-
ing zones.267 The division of zones has been criticized by some scholars as
“extremely rough and crude.”268 They are in favor of a system based on the
risk estimate from the Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Map (“PSHM”).269 The
259 Id.
260 Id.
261 See Nobuyoshi Yamori et al., Preparing for Large Natural Catastrophes: The Current
State and Challenges of Earthquake Insurance in Japan 15 (Munich Personal RePEc
Archive, MPRA Paper No. 8851, 2009), available at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8851
/1/MPRA_paper_8851.pdf.
262 See Toshio Fujimi & Hirokazu Tatano, Ambiguity, Risk and Earthquake Insurance
Premium: An Empirical Analysis, 49 ANNUALS OF DISASTER PREVENTION RESEARCH INST.
137, 137–38 (2006).
263 See NLIRO, supra note 16, at 41–42.
264 See id.
265 See Michio Naoi et al., Community Rating, Cross Subsidies and Underinsurance: Why
So Many Households in Japan Do Not Purchase Earthquake Insurance, 40 J. REAL ESTATE
FIN. ECON. 544, 560 (2010).
266 Id. at 547.
267 Id.
268 Id. at 547–48.
269 Id. at 559–60.
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PSHM is provided by the National Research Institute for Earth Science
and Disaster Prevention and shows the probability of earthquake occur-
rence and the likely range of seismic intensity.270 Using the PSHM leads
to more accurate risk calculations, because while the risk classification
under the existing rating system is based on the prefectural level, the
PSHM shows that the earthquake risk also differs within a prefecture.271
Moreover, the possibility of an earthquake over magnitude six in the next
thirty years varies drastically by region, from more than twenty-six percent
to less than 0.1 percent.272 According to the existing zone classification
system, the premium disparity between Class 1 (low risk) and Class 4 (high
risk) is only 1.19 yen per thousand yen insured for non-wooden structures
and 2.13 yen per thousand yen insured for wooden structures.273 The sig-
nificant variation in earthquake risk between classes is not sufficiently re-
flected in the premium rating.274 The existing community uniform rating
may cross subsidize inhabitants in high risk areas at the expense of inhab-
itants in low risk areas who are currently charged similar premiums.275
3. Earthquake Insurance and the Role of Government
The above arguments are made mainly from the perspective of
efficiency. Premiums should be risk-based, so that households will have
incentives to buy insurance and take risk mitigation measures.276 An in-
surance system needs to be fair and affordable as well; there is a tradeoff
between efficiency and equity in designing the compensation system for
natural disasters.277 Efficiency requires premiums to reflect risks. On the
other hand, insurance needs to be affordable, especially for the ones who
are now residing in the hazard-prone areas.278 This tradeoff can be achieved
with a certain level of government intervention.
270 Id. at 553.
271 See Naoi et al., supra note 265, at 553–54.
272 See What Are the National Seismic Hazard Maps for Japan?, JAPAN SEISMIC HAZARD
INFORMATION STATION, http://www.j-shis.bosai.go.jp/en/shm.
273 NLIRO, supra note 16, at 42.
274 See Yamori et al., supra note 261, at 19–20.
275 See Naoi et al., supra note 265, at 560.
276 See Picard, supra note 257, at 19.
277 Id. at 26–27; see also Scott E. Harrington & Greg Niehaus, Government Insurance, Tax
Policy, and the Affordability and Availability of Catastrophe Insurance, 19 J. INS. REG.
591, 603–05 (2001).
278 See Kunreuther, supra note 57, at 12–13.
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The government can provide insurance directly, act as a reinsurer,
set uniform insurance premiums, or use some other policy measures, with
less direct intervention, such as tax policy. Usually, there is a preference to
stimulate competitive insurance markets rather than having direct govern-
ment support.279 Direct government support may create moral hazard prob-
lems by giving the consumer false incentives in preparing for, and taking
mitigation measures for, a natural disaster. Moral hazard is less of a prob-
lem in the case of insurance. A survey conducted by NLIRO in 2003 shows
that one third of the respondents who had earthquake insurance coverage
responded that they “had considered the method of construction and manu-
facturing of residential property at the time of construction,” while the
proportion falls to about eighteen percent for non-insured respondents.280
This result shows that taking an earthquake insurance policy does not
deteriorate the incentives to take mitigation measures.
In a competitive insurance market, the government can still take
some measures to make insurance affordable and fair. However, it should
be kept in mind that government interventions aimed at subsidizing insur-
ance should only be targeted at people who are currently residing in the
risk-prone areas. Insurance subsidies for incoming residents will encourage
the development of those areas and exacerbate the potential catastrophic
losses.281 Targeting only current residents can be achieved by tax subsidy
transfers,282 providing insurance vouchers to those who are now residing in
hazard-prone areas,283 or allowing insurers to make tax-deferred reserves.284
In Japan, a tax-deferred reserve is adopted for household earthquake
279 See id. at 10–11.
280 Yamori et al., supra note 261, at 12–13. This survey is referred to as the “Consumer
Awareness Survey Regarding the Danger of Major Earthquakes” and is one of the few
large scale surveys of attitudes regarding household earthquake insurance in Japan. Id.
The survey was conducted nationwide on 3700 households, of which 3361 responded. Id. Of
those respondents, 1435 were policyholders of earthquake insurance, 961 with only fire
insurance, and 965 were not covered by non–life insurance. Id.
281 See Kunreuther, supra note 57, at 12–13.
282 See Picard, supra note 257.
283 Kunreuther, supra note 57, at 12; see also Howard Kunreuther & Mark Pauly, Rules
Rather than Discretion: Lessons from Hurricane Katrina, 33 J. RISK UNCERTAINTY 101
(2006).
284 Scott Harrington & Greg Niehaus, Government Insurance, Tax Policy, and the
Affordability and Availability of Catastrophe Insurance, 19 J. INS. REG. 591, 606 (2001).
Under such a system, insurers are allowed to make tax deductible contributions from pre-
mium income to a special reserve. Id. The funds from this reserve would be available for
catastrophic losses. Id. The total accumulation of tax-deferred contributions is “limited
to specified multiples of premiums (net of reinsurance) for each line of business.” Id.
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insurance.285 In 2006, a new premium tax deduction system for earth-
quake insurance was introduced.286 Individuals can deduct the amount of
premiums paid from their income up to 50,000 yen (651 USD) under the
Income Tax Law and 25,000 yen (325 USD) under the Local Tax Law.287
Another proposal has been given to overcome some of the inefficien-
cies of the existing catastrophic insurance system: to provide long-term
homeowner insurance and to cover all hazards.288 A long-term insurance
policy will give policyholders stability and an assurance for the protection
of their property during the whole period of ownership. It also gives policy-
holders incentives to invest in mitigation, since their investment will be
repaid with the reduction in premiums in the following years. All-hazard
coverage is desirable because the costly process of determining the reason
for the damage is no longer necessary.289 The insurers do not need to de-
termine whether the damage is caused by earthquake or fire if both are
covered.290 It also reduces homeowners’ confusion as to whether or not
they have coverage.291 Besides, the “diversification of risk across many
hazards” reduces the risks for insurers.292 Of course, this proposal also has
challenges, such as the pricing and acceptability of such policies. How-
ever, it provides another avenue to address the difficulties in providing
catastrophic insurance.
In Japan, this proposal has been put into practice. The insurance
provided by Kyosai is one of the examples. This insurance policy is provided
for five or more years.293 This policy covers residential buildings and prop-
erty from damage caused by fire, flood, earthquakes, and other disasters.294
This system applies quite broadly, even more broadly than earthquake
insurance provided by private insurers.295
The government plays an active role in the provision of earth-
quake insurance by supporting the reinsurance scheme.296 As discussed
285 Alberto Monti, Policy Approaches to the Financial Management of Large Scale Disasters,
in 12 POLICY ISSUES IN INSURANCE: FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT OF LARGE-SCALE CATASTROPHES
75, 78 (2008).
286 Id.
287 Id.
288 Kunreuther, supra note 57, at 18–19.
289 Id.
290 See id.
291 Id.
292 Id.
293 Yamori & Okada, supra note 63, at 190.
294 See id.
295 See id.
296 See supra Part I.A.1.c.
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previously,297 the government bears a substantial part of the reinsurance
risk. JER provides reinsurance and the government plays a role in this
respect as well.298 It is unclear whether the government charges a fee for
the support to the reinsurance scheme. To the extent that this is not the
case, this intervention by the government in the earthquake reinsurance
scheme could be considered a subsidy, which could be criticized from an
economic perspective.
Another problem is the fact that government support is still pro-
vided in addition to insurance. This type of government support can lead to
a so-called “charity hazard,” meaning that the compensation would create
a moral hazard problem on the side of victims who would have no incentive
any longer to demand disaster insurance.299 That is why economists often
consider government-provided compensation as a “catastrophic response
to catastrophic risk.”300
The compensation provided by the government in Japan seems to
be relatively limited. While there is support for reconstructing livelihoods,
and there are condolence grant programs, the support provided by these
government aid programs seems to be more modest than the compensation
payments offered via insurance coverage.301 Since insurance coverage is not
complete, some government aid (via disaster relief programs) is focused on
in-kind support that would not be provided via insurance coverage.302
Cash payments through government aid are very limited.303 That
is why the government support programs exist in addition to, not in place
of, insurance. However, the question can still be asked whether the relative
generosity of government support programs in Japan may also be one of
the causes of the low penetration of earthquake insurance. A criticism on
generous government support for natural disasters is that this government
support usually does not provide any incentives for risk reduction, while
297 See id.
298 See Yamori, supra note 63, at 192.
299 See Mark J. Browne & Robert E. Hoyt, The Demand for Flood Insurance: Empirical
Evidence, 20 J. RISK UNCERTAINTY 291, 293 (2000). See generally Paul A. Raschky &
Hannelore Weck-Hanneman, Charity Hazard—A Real Hazard to Natural Disaster
Insurance?, 7 ENVTL. HAZARD 321, 321–29 (2007).
300 Richard A. Epstein, Catastrophic Responses to Catastrophic Risks, 12 J. RISK UNCER-
TAINTY 287, 287 (1996); Louis Kaplow, Incentives and Government Relief for Risk, 4 J.
RISK UNCERTAINTY 167, 172–73 (1991).
301 See supra Part I.D.
302 See id.
303 See id.
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insurance programs do.304 However, in Japan it is apparently not con-
sidered problematic that all victims may benefit from government relief
even though some victims have purchased insurance and others did not.
It is apparently considered very important to treat all victims in an equal
manner.305 Since insurance coverage306 only is limited to 30% to 50% of the
amount of fire insurance, government support is meant to come on top
of the insurance coverage. For example, the Act Concerning Support for
Reconstructing Livelihoods of Disaster Victims, discussed above,307 allows
victims to receive up to 3 million yen in cash (39,000 USD) in addition to
insurance.308 However, given that insurance coverage is limited, this should
not necessarily create a charity hazard.
The precise interplay between insurance and government-provided
compensation in Japan may still merit further attention, particularly with
respect to the question to what extent the government-provided compensa-
tion would influence the incentives to seek insurance coverage.
4. Mandatory Insurance?
Above we indicated that the penetration rate of privately provided
earthquake insurance for households is relatively low: only about one
quarter.309 Even if one adds the coverage provided via the Kyosai,310 cov-
erage remains limited.311 On the other hand, data shows Japan’s vulnera-
bility to serious earthquakes.312 Table 1, provided above, shows that in the
past century Japan has been hit by many major earthquakes,313 and the
literature also indicates that the probability of new earthquakes occurring
in Japan has to be taken seriously as well.314 The following table provides
an estimate of these occurrence probabilities concerning earthquakes:
304 George L. Priest, The Government, the Market and the Problem of Catastrophic Loss,
12 J. RISK UNCERTAINTY 219, 228 (1996); Scott E. Harrington, Rethinking Disaster Policy,
23 REG.—THE CATO REV. OF BUS. AND GOV’T 40, 43 (2000).
305 Shimada Interview, supra note 67.
306 NLIRO, supra note 16, at 31–32.
307 See supra Part I.D.1.c.
308 NLIRO, supra note 16, at 73.
309 See supra Part I.E.2.
310 See supra Part I.A.2.
311 Shimada Interview, supra note 67.
312 See JAPAN SEISMIC HAZARD INFORMATION STATION, supra note 272.
313 See Table 1, supra Part I.
314 See NLIRO, supra note 16, at 55.
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TABLE 7: OCCURRENCE PROBABILITY OF EARTHQUAKES WITH GROUND
MOTIONS EQUAL TO OR LARGER THAN JAPAN METEOROLOGICAL
AGENCY SEISMIC INTENSITY 6 LOWER WITHIN 30 YEARS.315
Taking into account the relatively low penetration rate of earth-
quake insurance and the relatively high probability of earthquakes in
Japan, the question could be asked whether the insurance system should
be made compulsory or not. Strong arguments in favor of mandatory com-
prehensive insurance for the coverage of natural disasters have been
315 See JAPAN SEISMIC HAZARD INFORMATION STATION, supra note 272.
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presented in economic literature.316 Given the particular vulnerability of
Japan and the behavioral biases preventing people from taking adequate
insurance coverage, which apparently play a serious role in Japan as well,
there seem to be strong arguments in favor of comprehensive earthquake
insurance in Japan. Comprehensive insurance may also have the advan-
tage that it could deal with the problem of reduced incentives to purchase
insurance which may follow from generous government support.
II. THE COMPENSATION SYSTEM FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE317
Nuclear energy is an important energy source in Japan. It is re-
ported that as of 2009, “fifty-four commercial nuclear power plants are
operating at 17 stations with a total licensed generating capacity of 48,847
MWe which was approximately 20% of the total capacity of electric power
generation.”318 In 2009, the total amount of power generated by nuclear
power plants was 279.80 TWh, or about thirty percent of Japan’s total elec-
tric power supply.319
In a country like Japan, where nuclear energy is so prominent, the
liability system to prevent and compensate nuclear damage is extremely
important. Japan does not participate in any international convention on
civil liability for nuclear damage.320 Japan has not felt the need to join in-
ternational conventions, since other major nuclear powers, like the U.S.,
India, and China, were not party to the international nuclear liability con-
ventions either.321 Japan established its own national regime through
four major legislative instruments: the Act on Compensation for Nuclear
Damage (“Act on Compensation”), the Order for the Execution of the Act on
Compensation for Nuclear Damage (“Order on Compensation”), the Act
316 See, e.g., Howard Kunreuther, The Case for Comprehensive Disaster Insurance, 11 J.L.
& ECON. 133, 162 (1968); see also Howard Kunreuther, Mitigating Disaster Losses Through
Insurance, 12 J. RISK UNCERTAINTY 171, 182–83 (1996).
317 For a detailed analysis of the compensation system for nuclear damage in Japan as well
as of the Fukushima incident, see Julius Weitzdörfer, Die Haftung für Nuklearschäden
Nach Japanischem Atomrecht—Rechtsprobleme der Reaktorkatastrofe von Fukushima I,
Zeitschrift für Japanisches Rech, 31 J. OF JAPANESE LAW 61 (2011) (Liability for Nuclear
Damages Pursuant to Japanese Atomic Law—Legal Problems Arising from the Fukushima I
Nuclear Accident).
318 JAPAN NUCLEAR ENERGY SAFETY ORG., CURRENT STATUS OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES IN
JAPAN 1 (2010), available at http://www.jnes.go.jp/english/activity/unkan/e-unkanhp1/e
-unkanhp1-2010/book1/book.pdf.
319 Id. at 4.
320 See Liability for Nuclear Damage, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, http://www.world-nuclear.org
/info/inf67.html (last updated Mar. 2012).
321 Shimada Interview, supra note 67.
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on Indemnity Agreement for Compensation of Nuclear Damage (“Act on
Indemnity”) and the Order for the Execution of the Act on Indemnity Agree-
ment for Compensation of Nuclear Damage (“Order on Indemnity”).322 A
number of principles of the international third-party liability regimes are
embodied in those laws.323
A. Liability Rules for Nuclear Damage
The Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage of 1961 shapes the
major structure of the liability rules for nuclear damage and the corre-
sponding financial requirements.324 The Act on Compensation was ini-
tially passed in 1961, and was amended in 2009.325 Many different kinds of
activities were covered under the Act on Compensation: reactor operation,
production, reprocessing, the use of nuclear fuel, storage of spent fuel, and
waste disposal of nuclear fuel or material contaminated by nuclear fuel.326
The scope of the nuclear operation is quite broadly defined: not only nuclear
reactors, but also many other facilities in the nuclear cycle are covered.327
The Japanese law is the result of a careful compromise between the in-
terests involved, which is made clear in Section 1, which states that the
Act on Compensation aims both at the protection of victims as well as at
the promotion of the further development of nuclear energy.328 The text
of Section 1 literally reads: “[t]he purpose of this act is to protect persons
suffering from nuclear damage and to contribute to the sound development
of the nuclear industry by establishing the basic system regarding compen-
sation in case of nuclear damage caused by reactor operation.”329
322 Copies of English translations can be found at the website of NEA; see Japan, NUCLEAR
ENERGY AGENCY, http://www.oecd-nea.org/law/legislation/japan.html (last visited Nov. 2,
2012).
323 The major principles underlying the international nuclear liability conventions contain:
strict liability, channeling of liability to the nuclear operator, limited liability, compulsory
insurance, exclusive jurisdiction and public funding. For the details of those principles, see
Tom Vanden Borre, Nuclear Liability: An Anachronism in EU Energy Policy?, in EURO.
ENERGY L. REP. VII 177, 184 (Martha M. Roggenkamp & Ulf Hammer eds., 2010). Some of
those principles are followed in Japanese nuclear law, such as strict liability, channeling
of liability and compulsory financial coverage. The major difference is that unlimited lia-
bility applies in the Japanese system. The details of those features are discussed in the
following section. See infra Part II.A.
324 Genshiryoku Songai no Baisho ni Kansuru Houritsu [The Act on Compensation for
Nuclear Damage], Law No. 147 of 1961, amended by Act No. 19 of 2009 (Japan).
325 Id.
326 Id. § 2.
327 Id.
328 Id. § 1.
329 Id.
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The Act on Compensation stipulates liability for nuclear damage.
The term “nuclear damage” is defined as “any damage caused by the effects
of the fission process of nuclear fuel, or of the radiation from nuclear fuel
etc. or of the toxic nature of such materials.”330 This is broader than the U.S.
nuclear liability regime. In the U.S., the Price-Anderson Act imposes the
“public liability” for nuclear damage, which means “any liability arising
out of or resulting from a nuclear incident or precautionary evacuation.”331
Under the Japanese regime, there is no requirement of a sudden incident.332
In other words, either damage caused by a nuclear incident or gradual
damage can be covered under the Act on Compensation.
As in the international regime, a strict liability regime for nuclear
damage is established in Japan, and the liability is channeled to the nu-
clear operator.333 However, if the damage is caused by the willful act of a
third party, the operator who has compensated the damage has a right of
recourse against the third party.334 Moreover, a nuclear operator can enter
into a “special agreement with any person regarding rights of recourse.”335
In other words, through a special contractual arrangement, a nuclear op-
erator has the possibility to recover damages from the contractors who
actually contributed to the risks, including plant designers or builders.
If the nuclear damage is caused by a “grave natural disaster of an
exceptional character or by an insurrection,” the nuclear operator can be
exonerated from liability.336 The phrase “of an exceptional character” is
essential to determine the exoneration of liability in the context of the
Fukushima accident.337 Nuclear operators can still be held liable for the
nuclear damage caused by an ordinary natural disaster, such as earth-
quake or volcanic eruption, but they can cover such losses through an
indemnity agreement with the government.338 In the other words, if the
natural disasters can not be identified as of an exceptional nature, the op-
erators are still liable. Since insurers usually exclude the damage caused
330 The Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage § 2(2).
331 42 U.S.C. § 2014(w).
332 The Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage §§ 1–2.
333 Id. § 3. The Act on Compensation makes clear that when nuclear damage is caused, the
nuclear operator who is engaged in the reactor operation shall be liable for the damage.
Id. The title mentions that it is a “liability without fault.” Id. Section 4 holds a channeling
provision which is formulated as follows: “Where nuclear damage is covered by the preced-
ing section, no other person other than the nuclear operator who is liable for the damage
pursuant to the preceding section shall be liable for the damage.” Id. § 4.
334 Id. § 5.
335 Id.
336 Id. § 3.
337 Id.
338 Id. § 10.
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by natural disasters from liability insurance policies, this kind of risk is
covered by an indemnity agreement concluded with the government.339
A major difference between the Japanese regime and the inter-
national regime is that in Japan the liability of the nuclear operator is
unlimited.340 Although there is a minimum for the requirement of finan-
cial security that has to be provided by the operator, he is still liable for
damage in excess of this amount.341 The details of the financial security are
discussed in the following subsection. The prescription period is not spe-
cifically stipulated in the Act on Compensation, and is thus determined
by the Civil Code.342 According to Article 724 of the Civil Code, the claim
should be made within three years from the date on which the victims had
knowledge both of the damage and of the person liable for such damage.343
The right to compensation is also extinguished twenty years after the date
on which the tort occurred.344 There is often a long lapse between the
occurrence of a nuclear accident or exposure and the appearance of the
damage.345 To apply the usual prescription period to nuclear damage hence
provides insufficient protection to victims. Even if the claim falls within
the limitation period, the claims may be difficult because of the challenges
of proving causation.346
In case of a nuclear accident, the Dispute Reconciliation Committee
for Nuclear Damage Compensation (“Reconciliation Committee”) may be
established as an organization attached to the Ministry for Education,
Culture, Sport, Science, and Technology (“MEXT”).347 The Reconciliation
Committee “shall be in charge of mediating reconciliation of any dispute
arising from compensation of nuclear damage and of preparing general
instructions to help operators reach a voluntary settlement of such dis-
putes.”348 Reconciliation Committees usually are established after a major
339 See Act on Indemnity Agreements for Compensation of Nuclear Damage, Act No. 148 of
1961, § 3 (Japan), amended by Act No. 19 of 2009.
340 See Ximena Vásquez-Maignan, Fukushima: Liability and Compensation, 29 NEA NEWS,
no. 2, 2011, at 9.
341 The Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage §§ 6–7.
342 MINP [Civil C.] 1896, art. 724 (Japan). An unofficial English translation is available
at http://tomeika.jur.kyushu-u.ac.jp/transaction/legislation/civil_code.pdf.
343 Id.
344 Id.
345 See Disasters: Nuclear Accidents, POLLUTIONISSUES.COM, http://www.pollutionissues
.com/Co-Ea/Disasters-Nuclear-Accidents.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2012).
346 Akihiro Watabe, An Economic Analysis of Nuclear Accidents in Japan, in PERSPECTIVES
ON INTERNATIONAL STATE AND LOCAL ECONOMICS 209, 228 (Gerald V. Liu ed., 2006).
347 The Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage § 18(1).
348 Id.
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accident. For example, after both the Tokai-mura accident in 1999 and the
Fukushima accident, a Reconciliation Committee was established to deal
with the compensation.349 The task of this Reconciliation Committee is to
“mediate reconciliation of any dispute arising from the compensation of
nuclear damage,” to “draft instructions establishing the scale of the nu-
clear damage and other general instructions” to help the settlement of the
dispute, and to “investigate and assess nuclear damage.”350
B. Financial Requirements
Nuclear damage may turn out to be catastrophic, which can dwarf
the financial capacity of the liable operators. Financial security provided
by operators can be used to guarantee the availability of a certain level of
assets in case of damage. The Act on Compensation imposes on the nuclear
operators obligations to provide financial security up to a certain level.351
The financial security is set as 120 billion yen (1.6 billion USD) for each
installation site or nuclear-powered ship, though the Cabinet Order may
provide for a lower amount.352 The details of the financial security are set
more specifically in the Order for the Execution of the Act on Compensa-
tion for Nuclear Damage.353 For the operation of a reactor “with a maximum
thermal rating of less than 10,000 kWth” and reprocessing facilities, the
amount is set as 120 billion yen (1.54 billion USD).354 For other installa-
tions, the financial security varies between 4 billion yen (51 million USD)
and 24 billion yen (308 million USD).355 The operator can satisfy his finan-
cial obligation by using a contract of liability insurance for nuclear damage,
an indemnity agreement (with the government) or a deposit approved by
MEXT. The operators have the obligation both to establish and maintain
the required level of financial security during their operation.356 After the
349 See Secretariat of the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, Tokai-Mura Accident, Japan,
Third Party Liability and Compensation Aspects, in INDEMNIFICATION OF DAMAGE IN THE
EVENT OF A NUCLEAR ACCIDENT 127, 129 (2003) [hereinafter Tokai-Mura Accident] (discuss-
ing the Tokai-Mura Reconciliation Committee); Emergency Support Measures for Nuclear
Sufferers, MINISTRY OF ECONOMY, TRADE AND INDUSTRY (May 12, 2011), http://www.meti
.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/20110512_provisional_payment_1.pdf (establishing
the Reconciliation Committee for the Fukushima accident).
350 The Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage § 18(2).
351 Id. § 6.
352 Id. § 7.1.
353 Order for the Execution of the Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage, Cabinet Order
No. 44 of 1962, § 2 (Japan), amended by Cabinet Order No. 201 of 2009.
354 Id. § 2(i).
355 Id. § 2.
356 The Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage § 7(1).
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payment of compensation for nuclear damage, the amount available for
compensation of nuclear damage may fall below the required level. If
MEXT deems it necessary to ensure full compensation, it may order the
operators to bring the amount available for compensation of nuclear dam-
age up to the required amount by a given time.357 The use of liability insur-
ance and the indemnity agreement is now discussed respectively.
1. Liability Insurance
Liability insurance is the primary instrument to provide financial
security for nuclear damage in Japan. The contract of liability insurance for
nuclear damage is defined as “the contract under which an insurer under-
takes to indemnify a nuclear operator for his loss arising from compensat-
ing nuclear damage, where the nuclear operator becomes liable for such
nuclear damage.”358 A nuclear accident has the potential to create cata-
strophic losses and the amount of financial security required from nuclear
operators is also too large for a single insurance company. Therefore, as is
also the practice in other countries, the insurers in Japan pooled together
to provide insurance coverage for nuclear risks.359 The nuclear liability
insurance policy is provided by the Japan Atomic Energy Insurance Pool
(“JAEIP”), an organization established by twenty-three private insurers.360
Unlike American nuclear insurance pools, JAEIP provides both a liability
insurance policy and property damage policies.361
When the Act on Compensation was initially passed in 1961, the
amount required for financial security was 5 billion yen (64 million USD).362
This amount proved too low to compensate for the potential catastrophic
nuclear damage. It is also lower than the compensation available under the
Paris Convention and the Brussels Complementary Convention.363 The
357 Id. § 7(2).
358 Id. § 8.
359 Carolyn Bandel & Natalie Obiko Pearson, Atomic Cleanup Cost Goes to Japan’s
Taxpayers, May Spur Liability Shift, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 23, 2011, 8:45 AM), http://www
.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-23/nuclear-cleanup-cost-goes-to-japan-s-taxpayers-may
-spur-liability-shift.html.
360 Liability for Nuclear Damage, supra note 320.
361 Joanne Wojcik, Coverage Restrictions Expected to Limit Nuclear Claims, BUS. INS.
(Mar. 20, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20110320/ISSUE01
/303209974.
362 See Prof Koide June 2011 Lecture, FUKUSHIMA311WATCHDOGS.ORG (2011), available
at http://www.fukushima311watchdogs.org/biblio/8/Prof%20Koide%20June%202011%20
lecture.pdf.
363 Supplementary Convention to the Paris Convention of 29 July 1960 on Third Party Lia-
bility in the Field of Nuclear Energy, art. 3, Jan. 31, 1963, 1041 U.N.T.S. 358 (as amended
by the Additional Protocol of 28 January 1964 and by the Protocol of 16 November 1982).
176 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 37:129
amount for financial security in Japan was increased to 120 billion yen
in 2009.364 However, this total amount of 120 billion yen is not completely
covered by insurance. It can also be covered by an indemnity agreement or
a deposit.365
Under the liability policy provided by the JAEIP, the coverage
contains compensation for nuclear damage, legal expenses (including costs
for litigation, arbitration, settlement and mediation, which is approved by
the insurer), the costs of preservation of rights, and the costs of measures
to prevent the expansion of damage.366 The liability insurance policy dif-
ferentiates between nuclear damage and general damage.367 The term
nuclear damage contains the “nuclear damage” referred to in the Act on
Compensation, personal injury, property damage which results from the
radioactivity, explosion, and other harmful features of nuclear material.368
The term “general damage” refers to personal injury and property damage
other than that contained in “nuclear damage.”369 For the nuclear damage,
the accumulated limit of coverage as under other national nuclear pools
(a limit for the whole life cycle) is used.370 The limit for general damage
can be automatically reinstated after the payment for an accident.371 The
insurance policy excludes several kinds of damage: the damage caused
intentionally by the insured; a grave natural disaster of an exceptional
character or by an insurrection; the use of atomic energy for non-peaceful
purpose, earthquake, fire or tsunami; damage to the property owned, used
or managed by the insured; or damage to other property which is on-site
and used in connection with the insured’s facility.372
Not all nuclear damage for which an operator is liable is covered by
liability insurance. When the damage is not covered by insurance or other
financial security, the operator can enter an indemnity agreement with the
government to cover those losses.
364 The Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage § 7. The current version of Section 7
states that “financial security shall be provided by the conclusion of a contract of liability
insurance for nuclear damage and an indemnity agreement for compensation of nuclear
damage or by a deposit, approved by the Minister for Education, Culture, Sport, Science,
and Technology . . . as an arrangement that makes available for compensation of nuclear
damage, 120 billion yen.” Id.
365 Id.
366 Fujimi & Tatano, supra note 262, citing Liability Insurance for Nuclear Installations,
Common Clause 2000, art. 3 [hereinafter Clause 2000].
367 Id.
368 Id. art. 2.
369 Id.
370 Id. art. 4.
371 Id.
372 Clause 2000, art. 7.
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2. Indemnity Agreements
To compensate for the damage that is not covered by liability in-
surance or other means of financial security, a nuclear operator can enter
an indemnity agreement with the government. The Act on Indemnity
Agreements for Compensation of Nuclear Damage (“Act on Indemnity
Agreements”) and the Order for the Execution of the Act on Indemnity
Agreements for Compensation of Nuclear Damage (“Order on Indemnity
Agreements”) lay down the rules for such agreements.373
Nuclear damage caused by natural disasters is less predictable for
insurers, so it is excluded from insurance coverage in Japan. Nuclear dam-
age is also unique in its delayed manifestation: sometimes injuries or dam-
ages from nuclear exposure only appear decades after the accident and
exposure to radiation.374 This “long tail” characteristic poses a challenge
to the insurance market, which often only covers damage that happens
within ten years after the occurrence of the nuclear event.375 These terms
are the norm in Japan.376 Damage caused by natural disaster and damage
claimed beyond a period of ten years from the date of an event are covered
in the indemnity agreements.377
The indemnity clause also covers nuclear damage caused by nor-
mal operation, and other damages provided for in the Cabinet Order.378
To further clarify the concepts, the Order on Indemnity Agreements ex-
cludes three kinds of damage from the category “damage caused by normal
operation”379: damage caused by a breach of some specified sections of the
Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel and Reactors; “damage
to an installation for reactor operation”; and damage caused by a “natural
cataclysm or the act of a third party.”380 Other damage covered by the Cabi-
net Order refers to the damage resulting from a tidal wave.381 In other
373 See Act on Indemnity Agreements for Compensation of Nuclear Damage, Act No. 148
of 1961 (Japan); Order for the Execution of the Act on Indemnity Agreements for Compen-
sation of Nuclear Damage, Act No. 45 of 1962 (Japan).
374 Miles O’Brien, Fukushima After the Meltdown, PBS NEWSHOUR (Mar. 15, 2012), http://
www.pbs.org/newshour/multimedia/fukushima/.
375 Liability for Nuclear Damage, supra note 320.
376 Act on Indemnity Agreements for Compensation of Nuclear Damage § 3.
377 Id.
378 Id.
379 Id.
380 Order for the Execution of the Act on Indemnity Agreements for Compensation of
Nuclear Damage § 1.
381 Id. § 2.
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words, the damage resulting from a tidal wave is not covered by insurance,
but it is covered under the indemnity agreement with the government.382
As stated above, Section 3 of the Act of 1961 provides that the oper-
ator of a nuclear facility is not strictly liable “in the case where the damage
is caused by a grave natural disaster of an exceptional character or by an
insurrection.”383 However, Section 17 makes clear that where this exoner-
ation of the operator’s liability applies or where nuclear damage is deemed
to exceed the amount covered by insurance, “the Government shall take
the necessary measures to relieve victims and to prevent the damage from
spreading.”384 Though Section 17 does not give the victim a subjective
right to compensation it does make clear that when the exoneration of the
operator’s liability for a grave natural disaster of an exceptional character
would apply, victims would still be compensated since in that case the gov-
ernment would step in.385 That is precisely the function of the indemnity
agreement between the operator and government.
The amount covered by the indemnity agreement with the govern-
ment should total the required amount of financial security (120 billion
yen), less the amount available by other means (insurance or other in-
demnity agreements).386 The duration of the indemnity agreement is from
the “time of its conclusion to the time when the reactor operation . . . has
ceased.”387 To seek the coverage of an indemnity agreement, the operator
has to pay the government an indemnity fee. The indemnity fee is deter-
mined by multiplying the indemnity agreement amount by the rate that
the Order provides.388 According to the Order that rate shall be 3 (indem-
nity fee) for 10,000 (amount being indemnified) or 1.5 for 10,000 for the
reactor in universities and technical colleges.389 The rate can be increased
later by the government if the amount available for indemnity at the time
the indemnity fee is paid is insufficient.390 The operators have an obligation
to notify the government of a number of operational details and specifica-
tions.391 The government has the right to cancel the indemnity agreement
382 Id. § 2.
383 Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage § 3.
384 Id. § 17.
385 Id.
386 Act on Indemnity Agreements for Compensation of Nuclear Damage § 4.
387 Id. § 5.
388 Id. § 6.
389 Order for the Execution of the Act on Indemnity Agreements for Compensation of
Nuclear Damage § 3.
390 Id.
391 Notification requirements are set for different kinds of indemnity agreements, such as
for the indemnity agreement relating to reactor operation, to production, reprocessing, the
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if the operators do not meet the required level of financial security with all
combined factors, fail to pay the indemnity fee, fail to notify or take mea-
sures pursuant to specified regulations, or breach the requirement to take
the necessary steps to prevent or mitigate nuclear damage when such dam-
age occurs or is likely to occur.392 When the operators breach some specified
requirements, they may be subject to fines of an amount equivalent to
1/10th of the indemnification received or 100,000 yen (1283 USD).393
This means that the Japanese state intervenes in the compensation
for the victims of a nuclear accident on the basis of an indemnity agreement
for which the operator pays a fee to the state. Moreover, the total coverage
of 120 billion yen is not a maximum but rather a minimum amount, to be
covered via a combination of insurance and indemnity agreements.394 If the
damage is still higher, the state could intervene under Section 16 of the
Act on Compensation.395 This refers to the case when the amount of the
damage is higher than the required security of 120 billion yen. Further
state intervention is possible on the basis of a political decision.396 This
provision comes into play where an operator could become insolvent if
liability is too high.
The compensation system, also taking into account the case of a
natural disaster, can hence be summarized as follows:
use of nuclear fuel, and so on. For example, in the indemnity agreement relating to the reac-
tor operation, the nuclear operator needs to notify the government of the following issues:
the use of the nuclear reactor, type, the thermal rating and number of nuclear reactors;
name and address of the installations or sites equipped with a nuclear reactor; location,
structure and equipment of the building housing the nuclear reactor, types and quantity of
the nuclear materials to be used as fuel in the nuclear reactor; and the method of dispos-
ing of spent fuel and information about the liability insurance contract. See Order for the
Execution of the Act on Indemnity Agreements for Compensation of Nuclear Damage § 4.
392 See Act on Indemnity Agreements for Compensation of Nuclear Damage, § 15; Order for
the Execution of the Act on Indemnity Agreements for Compensation of Nuclear Damage § 9.
393 Order for the Execution of the Act on Indemnity Agreements for Compensation of
Nuclear Damage § 11.
394 Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage § 7.
395 Section 16 states:
[w]here nuclear damage occurs, the Government shall give a nuclear op-
erator (except the nuclear operator of a foreign nuclear ship) such aid as
is required for him to compensate the damage, when the actual amount
which he should pay for the nuclear damage pursuant to Section 3 ex-
ceeds the financial security amount and when the government deems
it necessary in order to attain the objectives of this act.
Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage § 16(1).
396 Indeed, Section 16(2) of the Act on Compensation provides that this aid shall be given
to the extent that the government is authorized to do so by decision of the National Diet.
Ultimately, the decision is the Japanese parliament’s. Act on Compensation for Nuclear
Damage § 16(2).
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TABLE 8: LIABILITY IN CASE OF A NUCLEAR ACCIDENT IN JAPAN397
Liability in case of a nuclear accident
1. “Normal” incident
(Art. 3, 1)
2. Earthquake,
tsunami, volcanic
eruption, latent
damages (Art. 3, 1)
3. Insurrection and
great natural di-
sasters of an excep-
tional character
(Art. 3, 1)
No liability of oper-
ator and discretion-
ary compensation
by government
(necessary mea-
sures to relieve
victims according to
Section 17)
Liability insurance
until 120 billion
yen (Section 8)
Indemnity
agreement until
120 billion yen
(Section 10)
On top of that: liability of operator
(unlimited, Section 3)
When necessary (in case of insolvency):
discretionary state aid (Section 16)
397 Weitzdörfer, supra note 317, at 75.
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C. Government Aid
The Act on Compensation requires operators to provide financial
security up to the amount of 120 billion yen.398 However, catastrophic nu-
clear damage can cost much more than that. When such catastrophes
happen, the government shall give a nuclear operator aid needed for com-
pensation if the government deems it necessary.399 Such aid should be
given to the extent authorized by the National Diet.400 When the damage
is caused by a grave natural disaster of an exceptional character or by an
insurrection, the government shall take the necessary steps to “relieve
victims and to prevent the damage from spreading.”401 Unlike an indem-
nity agreement with the government, under which the actual rights and
obligations of the government and the operator have been clearly estab-
lished and the indemnity amount is determined before a disaster, aid dis-
tribution in these cases is not clear and is to a large extent determined ad
hoc by the government. Unlike an indemnity agreement, which requires
a fee, such ad hoc arrangements do not require the operators to pay a price
for such aid.
D. Case Study: The Tokai-Mura and Fukushima Accidents
The Act on Compensation and Act on Indemnity Agreements came
into force in the 1960s.402 However, given the infrequency of nuclear acci-
dents, the Acts were not applied for the first time until 1999.403 A critical-
ity accident occurred at the facility of JCO Company Ltd. in Tokai-mura
in 1999.404 Some workers were exposed to radiation doses and the nearby
residents were required to evacuate.405 The accident triggered the first
application of the Act on Compensation in Japan, but was relatively small.
The Fukushima Accident, which has had far larger off-site impact than
the Tokai-mura accident,406 may create challenges to compensation under
398 Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage § 7.
399 Id. § 16.
400 Id.
401 Id. § 17.
402 See id.; Act on Indemnity Agreements for Compensation of Nuclear Damage.
403 See Tatsuya Murakami, The Compensation of Damage Following the Tokai-Mura
Accident, in INDEMNIFICATION OF DAMAGE IN THE EVENT OF A NUCLEAR ACCIDENT 117,
121 (2003).
404 Id. at 118.
405 Id.
406 See David McNeill, The Fukushima Nuclear Crisis and the Fight for Compensation, THE
ASIA-PACIFIC J.: JAPAN FOCUS, http://www.japanfocus.org/-David-McNeill/3707 (last visited
Nov. 2, 2012).
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the existing nuclear liability regime.407 This section analyzes those two
cases respectively to show how nuclear damage is compensated in practice
in Japan.
1. The Tokai-Mura Accident408
Japan’s first criticality accident occurred in a conversion test build-
ing at the JCO Company, Ltd.’s nuclear fuel fabrication plant in Tokai-
mura, in the Ibaraki Prefecture on September 30, 1999.409 JCO is a wholly
owned subsidiary of Sumitomo Metal Mining Co. (“SMM”) of Tokyo.410 The
criticality state continued for approximately twenty hours, contributed by
the recklessly executed mitigation operation carried out by JCO workers.411
The accident was caused by non-approved operating procedures applied to
the uranium fuel solutions.412 This accident was rated Level 4 on the INES,
indicating an event that would have little off-site risk.413 Three workers
suffered acute radiation syndrome, two of whom died.414 One hundred
sixty-one people who were within a 350-meter radius of the JCO plant
were evacuated.415 Another 310,000 people within a tem kilometer radius
of the JCO plant were asked by the Ibaraki Prefecture to stay indoors for
approximately eighteen hours.416
In response to the accident, JCO opened up a contact point to facil-
itate the consultation of victims on October 4, 1999.417 On October 22, 1999,
a Dispute Reconciliation Committee for Nuclear Damage Compensation
was established by the Science and Technology Agency (“STA”) in accor-
dance with the Act on Compensation.418 On the same day, the STA also
established the Nuclear Damage Investigation Study Group (“Study
407 See Murakami, supra note 403, at 121–22 (describing the problems that Tokai-mura
faced with respect to indemnification).
408 For an overview of the Tokai-mura incident, see J. Mark Ramseyer, Why Power
Companies Build Nuclear Reactors on Fault Lines: The Case of Japan, 31 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES IN L. 457 (2011).
409 K. Komura et al., The JCO Criticality Accident at Tokai-Mura, Japan: An Overview of
the Sampling Campaign and Preliminary Results, 50 J. ENVTL. RADIOACTIVITY 3, 4 (2000).
410 Tokaimura Criticality Accident, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N (July 2007), http://www.world
-nuclear.org/info/inf37.html.
411 See id.
412 Id.
413 Id.
414 Id.
415 Id.
416 Komura et al., supra note 409, at 4.
417 Tokai-Mura Accident, supra note 349, at 129.
418 Id.
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Group”) to analyze the accident and to establish criteria for determining
which nuclear damages should be compensated.419 It is reported that 8018
claims have been filed by citizens, businesses, and industrial organizations
by 2010; 6983 claims have been compensated.420 Mediation and negotia-
tion played an important role during the compensation procedure.421 The
prefectural government and other local authorities offered mediation be-
tween JCO and victims for an early settlement.422 According to this settle-
ment, JCO made 5.4 billion Japanese yen in provisional payments by the
end of 1999.423 “[A] Special Consultation Centre was set up in the Ibaraki
Prefecture Office from 31 January to 25 February 2000” to promote nego-
tiations with victims.424
a. Compensable Damages
The Tokai-mura accident triggered the application of the Act on
Compensation. As was mentioned above, the Act established strict liability
for nuclear damage.425 However, the definition of nuclear damage focuses
on the cause of the damage (whether it is the fission process or radiation
of nuclear fuel, the toxic natural of such materials), but remains vague as
to what actually constitutes damage.426 It is not clear whether the operators
are only liable for personal injury and property damage, or also liable for
consequential economic losses, and decontamination costs.
Toward this end, on May 26, 2000, the Study Group finalized a re-
port which established guidelines “to determine what damage caused by
the Tokai-mura accident would be qualified as ‘nuclear damage’ ” under the
Act on Compensation.427 According to the report, eight categories of damage
can be compensated under the Act, including personal injuries, medical ex-
amination expenses, evacuation expenses, property inspection expenses,
loss of contaminated property, lost income, business damage due to both
physical losses and reputational injuries, and mental suffering.428
419 Id.
420 Overview of Compensation for the JCO Criticality Accident, JAPANESE MINISTRY OF
EDUCATION, CULTURE, SPORTS, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY, http://www.mext.go.jp/b
_menu/shingi/chousa/kaihatu/016/shiryo/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2011/04/20/1305111_5.pdf.
421 See Tokai-Mura Accident, supra note 349, at 129.
422 Id.
423 Id.
424 Id.
425 Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage § 3.
426 Id. § 2.
427 See Tokai-Mura Accident, supra note 349, at 129.
428 See id. at 129–30.
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From the broad formulation, it can be concluded that the compensa-
ble losses contain evacuation costs, personal injury, property damage, and
economic losses.429 The category of “personal injury” contained not only
medical examination expenses and radiation injuries caused by exposure
as a result of the accident, but also mental suffering.430 Defining mental suf-
fering, the report clarifies that mental anguish without physical injury does
not qualify “unless the claimants can irrefutably prove a causal relation-
ship and the proportionality of the amount of compensation sought.”431
“Economic loss” contains property damage, which is evaluated
through the reduction of economic value of the property.432 In the case of
movable property, the compensable loss is the depreciated value of the
property; in the case of real estate, the damage is only compensable when
there was a firm intention to sell the property or other clear economic
loss.433 The contamination itself and the costs of decontamination are not
compensable under this category.434 In other words, environmental damage
was not a compensable category in this case.435 An explanation for this may
be that the accident was classified at level 4 INES, which means there was
no significant off-site impact.436
Another issue worth noting is that the economic losses did not only
contain damage due to physical effects, but also extended to damage due
to reputational injury.437 The damage to reputation is a pure economic loss
and is not always compensable.438 To define and constrict the scope of this
429 Id.
430 Id.
431 Id. at 130.
432 Id.
433 See Tokai-Mura Accident, supra note 349, at 130.
434 See id.
435 See id.
436 Tokaimura Criticality Accident, supra note 410.
437 Tokai-Mura Accident, supra note 349, at 130. In Japan, some criteria are established
to limit economic losses caused by a nuclear accident (both due to physical effects and to
rumor). After the JCO accident, “economic loss suffered between the time of the accident
and 30 November 1999, within a 10 km radius of the accident site, and caused by loss of
custom which is estimated to be reasonable given the circumstances of the accident,” was
eligible for compensation. See Tokai-Mura Accident, supra note 349, at 130.
438 Under the international regimes for nuclear liability, the scope of compensable economic
losses is limited. Under the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear
Energy, only damage to or loss of life and any person, as well as damage to or loss of prop-
erty are compensable. Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy
art. 3, opened for signature July 29, 1960, 956 U.N.T.S. 264. Under the 2004 protocol of Paris
Convention, the economic losses become compensable, however, only to the extent that they
are arising from personal injury or property damage. Final Act of the Conference on the
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category, the report sets some conditions, such as the time at which such
loss was caused, the distance from the accident site, whether the loss of cus-
tomers was estimated to be reasonable and the actual decrease in income.439
Since damage to reputation is also compensated for a nuclear accident that
does not have significant off-site impact, the compensation has extended
all over the Ibaraki Prefecture.440
According to the Act on Compensation, the nuclear operators are
obliged to seek financial security up to the amount determined in the Act
or corresponding Cabinet Order.441 The operators can either fulfill this ob-
ligation by seeking insurance coverage or by concluding indemnity agree-
ments with the government.442 At the time of the Tokai-mura accident, the
amount of coverage required for a nuclear power plant was 30 billion yen.443
For facilities producing nuclear fuel, such as the JCO plant, the required
amount was only 1 billion yen.444 This amount was far from sufficient to
cover the damage caused by this accident. Moreover, the amount of com-
pensation available from JCO was also insufficient.445 To make sure suf-
ficient assets would be available to compensate for the damage, the local
authorities chose extra-legal measures, like organizing negotiations with
JCO’s parent company, SMM, about the compensation.446 By September 30,
2000, “98% of the claims were settled for a total amount of 12.73 billion”
yen (163 million USD), of which 1 billion yen (13 million USD) was covered
by the Japan Atomic Energy Insurance Pool.447 The insurance pool deter-
mined its own claims handling standards for damage claims arising from
Revision of the Paris Convention and of the Brussels Supplementary Convention, Feb. 12,
2004. Similar stipulations can be found in the Vienna Convention, as amended by the
Protocol of 1997 to amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage.
Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage art. 1, opened for signature
May 21, 1963, 1063 U.N.T.S. 266. In other words, also others than those who suffer per-
sonal injury or property damage can claim for economic losses, while the one who suffers
from rumors without material damage cannot be compensated.
439 See Tokai-Mura Accident, supra note 349, at 130.
440 According to a presentation by Mr. Tatsuya Murakami, the Mayor of Tokai-mura village,
the Ibaraki Prefecture received 364 million yen and Tokai-mura received 56 million yen by
2000. See Murakami, supra note 403, at 121.
441 Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage § 7.
442 Id.
443 See Murakami, supra note 403, at 121.
444 Id.
445 It is difficult to estimate the exact available amount. However, by then, JCO’s assets were
estimated to be approximately 4 billion yen, but, as is the case with most companies, their
total assets could not be fully mobilized. See Tokai-Mura Accident, supra note 349, at 131.
446 See Murakami, supra note 403, at 121.
447 See Tokai-Mura Accident, supra note 349, at 130–31.
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the accident, which were in line with the Study Group guidelines.448 Since
JCO could not cover all the damage, SMM “provided assistance in respect
of the payment of the remainder.”449 It is reported that SMM put approx-
imately 127 million dollars in the special budget in 2000 to compensate
victims of the JCO accident.450
b. The Victims
Three groups of persons were affected by the accident and filed
claims against JCO. The first category is the workers.451 This is different
from the American system, where the claims under state or federal worker’s
compensation acts are excluded from the “public liability” defined under the
Price-Anderson Act.452 Under the Japanese nuclear liability regime, dam-
age suffered by workers is not excluded.453 The compensation of workers’
injuries comprises of two layers. Firstly, compensation should be made from
the Workers’ Accident Compensation Insurance System.454 If the workers
suffer damage in excess of the limit under the former system, they are en-
titled to recover the remainder from the liable operators.455 Compensation
can be made from the Workers’ Accident Compensation Insurance System
when the claimants are exposed to a dose in excess of 0.25 Sieverts of
radiation, “enough to cause acute radiation poisoning.”456 In the case of
the Tokai-mura accident, three workers were qualified to get compensation
from this system.457
A second category of the claimants is the residents.458 According to
the Study Group’s report, the residents nearby could claim for the costs
of evacuation, medical examination expenses, and personal injuries.459 But
an interesting phenomenon in this case was that JCO paid a total of 20 mil-
lion yen to people who lived up to 350 meters away from the plant, in the
448 Id. at 130.
449 Id. at 131.
450 Watabe, supra note 346, at 229.
451 See Tokai-Mura Accident, supra note 349, at 131.
452 42 U.S.C. § 2014(w).
453 Tokai-Mura Accident, supra note 349, at 131.
454 Id.
455 See id.
456 Id. at 131.
457 Id.
458 Id.
459 Tokai-Mura Accident, supra note 349, at 129–30.
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form of “consolation payments.”460 JCO’s payments are not obligatory, but
followed a Japanese tradition to offer discretionary payments to accident
victims.461 Some people living in that zone believed that the amount of con-
solation payments was insufficient, and filed claims for the remainder.462
The third category concerns industrial and agricultural activities.463 Dam-
age to reputations fell into this category, which composed the majority of
claims in this accident.464
c. Lessons from Tokai-Mura
The Tokai-mura accident was the first application of the regula-
tions concerning nuclear liability in Japan. Although these laws estab-
lished the regime of nuclear liability and compensation, the details of this
system still needed to be clarified via concrete cases. For example, the Act
on Compensation requires nuclear operators to obtain financial security,
which guarantees the availability of some assets in case of damage and a
certain level of cost internalization.465 However, what constitutes a nu-
clear damage is not clear, and needs examination in individual cases to be
defined. The amount set by legislation at the time of the accident proved
not to be enough, and was subsequently revised.466 After the accident, the
coverage required for a nuclear power plant was increased from 30 billion
yen (383 million USD) to 60 billion (767 million USD); and the financial
security for a facility like JCO’s plant was increased from 1 billion yen
(12.8 million USD) to 12 billion yen (153 million USD).467
In addition, alternatives to litigation played an important role in
the compensation for nuclear damage in this particular case. In this case,
a Dispute Reconciliation Committee for Nuclear Damage Compensation
was established to mediate reconciliation.468 Negotiations between local
authorities, victims, the liable operator, and even its parent company took
place to settle the claims. Nearly all the claims that resulted from the JCO
460 Id. at 131.
461 Id. at 131–32.
462 Id. at 132.
463 Id.
464 See id. at 131–33.
465 Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage § 6.
466 Murakami, supra note 403, at 121.
467 See Murakami, supra note 403, at 121.
468 Tokai-Mura Accident, supra note 349, at 129.
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accident have been settled.469 Only two claims were appealed to the Dispute
Reconciliation Committee for Nuclear Damage Compensation, and eleven
cases have reached the court.470
The definition of compensable damage used by the Dispute Recon-
ciliation Committee is comparatively broad, and it does not give hurdles as
strict as the tort system.471 Consolation payments were made; payments
were also made for mental suffering—connected to personal injury—and
damage to reputation.472 However, in the cases which reach the courts,
victims fare poorly. There are only a few cases in which the victims won
the litigation, and even then the result was less than ideal. For example,
a nearby food firm sued the JCO for its loss of business because consumers
were scared of radioactivity.473 The firm sued for 1.6 billion yen (20.5 million
yen), but were awarded only 180 million yen (2.3 billion USD).474 Because
JCO had already paid 213 million yen (2.7 million USD) as temporary pay-
ment, the food firm was required to repay the difference.475 More cases
were dismissed because the claimants failed to prove damages. In those
situations, victims were ordered to repay the entire amount of provisional
payment originally awarded by JCO.476
In spite of the broad definition of compensable damage under the
administrative procedure, the investigation process is criticized because of
its lack of transparency.477 Relevant information like the degree of causal-
ity and the related evidence on the estimated damage was rarely disclosed.
This could lead to a negative influence on the claims of potential victims.
Besides, although SMM decided to assume the liability because of repu-
tational considerations, it tried to hasten the settlement in order to evade
liability for latent damage.478 Despite the desirability of a comprehensive
administrative scheme to award broader compensation in the event of
nuclear disasters, the procedure needs to be more transparent and more
precedents need to be set to ensure sufficient and fair compensation.
469 Id.
470 Overview of Compensation for the JCO Criticality Accident, supra note 420.
471 See Ximena Vásquez-Maignan, Liability and Compensation for Nuclear Damage, OECD
NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY 26 (2012), available at http://www.aec.gov.tw/www/info/files
/energy_news_01-14-2.pdf.
472 Tokai-Mura Accident, supra note 349, at 130–31.
473 Ramseyer, supra note 408, at 15.
474 Id.
475 Id.
476 Id.
477 Watabe, supra note 346, at 229–32.
478 Id.
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2. The Fukushima Accident
a. The Fukushima Disaster: Natural and Man-Made
The Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant consists of six boiling water
reactors which are designed by General Electric (“GE”) and maintained by
the Tokyo Electric Power Company (“TEPCO”).479 After the 9.0 magnitude
earthquake hit Japan on March 11, 2011, the reactors Units 1, 2, and 3
were automatically shut down.480 The other three units had been shut down
prior to the earthquake for planned maintenance.481 After the shutdown of
the nuclear reactors, there was still decay heat from the radioactive decay
of the unstable isotopes.482 Nuclear fuel rods require several years of water
cooling in a spent fuel pool before decay heat production reduces to the
point that they can be safely transferred to dry storage casks.483 Cooling
pumps can be powered by on-site generators, off-site through the normal
power grid, by diesel generators, or by steam-turbine-driven emergency
core cooling systems, to circulate cooling water when the reactor is shut
down.484 After the March 11th earthquake and the following tsunami, the
plant stopped generating electricity, stopping the normal source of power.485
The tsunami led to a flood in the basement of the turbine buildings and dis-
abled the emergency diesel generators located there.486 The failure of the
479 See Stephen Kurczy, GE Defends Reactors in Japan Nuclear Crisis, THE CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR (Mar. 18, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2011/0318
/GE-defends-reactors-in-Japan-nuclear-crisis.
480 See Timeline for the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident, NUCLEAR ENERGY
AGENCY, http://www.oecd-nea.org/press/2011/NEWS-04.html (last updated Mar. 7, 2012)
[hereinafter Accident Timeline].
481 Id.
482 See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, DOE FUNDAMENTALS HANDBOOK: NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND
REACTOR THEORY 62 (1993), available at http://www.hss.doe.gov/nuclearsafety/techstds
/docs/handbook/h1019v2.pdf.
483 See Jay Friess & Andy Marso, What If It Happened Here? Evacuation Zones Outlined in
Case of Emergency at Calvert Cliffs, SOMDNEWS.COM (Mar. 23, 2011), http://ww2.somdnews
.com/stories/03232011/rectop133917_32384.shtml.
484 Mike Soraghan, Japan Disaster Raises Questions About Backup Power at U.S. Nuclear
Plants, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/03/24/24greenwire
-japan-disaster-raises-questions-about-backup-p-16451.html; see also W.S. RAUGHLEY,
REGULATORY EFFECTIVENESS OF THE STATION BLACKOUT RULE, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION 8 (Aug. 2003).
485 See MARK HOLT ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR DISASTER 1
(Jan. 18, 2012), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41694.pdf.
486 Id.
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cooling system subsequently led to the full meltdown in reactors 1, 2, and
3.487 A series of accidents was reported in the following weeks, including
hydrogen explosions and leaking of cooling water.488 GE has been criticized
for designing a plant that is vulnerable to earthquake and flooding risks.489
According to the design, the reactor’s energy diesel generators and DC
batteries were located in the basements of the reactor turbine buildings,
which were flooded because of the tsunami.490 It was reported that mid-
level engineers working on the construction of the plant were concerned
with the vulnerability of the back-up power systems to flooding.491 It is also
reported that GE was warned of the major design flaws in 1976 by three
GE nuclear technicians who resigned from their positions out of concerns
for the safety of the reactor they were designing.492
TEPCO chose to strictly follow GE’s design in the construction. To
comply with new regulatory requirements, three additional backup gener-
ators were placed in the building located on higher ground.493 However, the
switching stations that connect the generators and reactor cooling systems
were still in poorly protected turbine buildings.494 If the switching stations
had been moved inside the reactor buildings, the failure of the cooling sys-
tem would probably not have happened.495 Fukushima is the most expen-
sive catastrophe in modern Japanese history.496 This not only refers to the
nuclear incident, but also to the earthquake and tsunami of March 2011.497
This accident triggered the evacuation of a zone that extended up
to fifty kilometers (thirty-one miles) from the plant in some places.498 It
487 See 3 Nuclear Reactors Melted Down After Quake, Japan Confirms, CNNWORLD (Jun. 6,
2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-06-06/world/japan.nuclear.meltdown_1_nuclear-reactors
-fuel-rods-tokyo-electric-power?_s=PM:WORLD.
488 See Accident Timeline, supra note 480.
489 See Reiji Yoshida, GE Plan Followed with Inflexibility, THE JAPAN TIMES (Jul. 14, 2011),
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20110714a2.html.
490 Id.; see also Accident Timeline, supra note 480.
491 Yoshida, supra note 489.
492 See Matthew Mosk, Fukushima: Mark 1 Nuclear Reactor Design Caused GE Scientist
to Quit in Protest, ABC WORLD NEWS (Mar. 15, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter
/fukushima-mark-nuclear-reactor-design-caused-ge-scientist/story?id=13141287#.UEft8
Y2PWRE.
493 See Norihiko Shirouzu & Chester Dawson, Design Flaw Fueled Nuclear Disaster, WALL
ST. J. (Jun. 30, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405270230488790457639
5580035481822.html.
494 Id.
495 Id.
496 See Weitzdörfer, supra note 317, at 63.
497 Id.
498 See U.S. NRC Will Review Evacuation Zone Expansion, but Separate from Fukushima
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also caused concern about food and water supplies, and treatment of nu-
clear workers.499 The events at units 1, 2, and 3 have been rated at level 7
on the INES, and those at unit 4 as level 3 events.500 This means that wide-
spread health and environmental effects are expected from the Fukushima
Accident. How the nuclear damage resulting from this accident will be
compensated raises serious concerns.
b. Basic Structure of the Compensation
The nuclear accident developed quickly in the early weeks after the
earthquake and tsunami. The nuclear accident led to both substantial
property damage and third party damage.501 In Japan, as was explained
above, nuclear property damage insurance is available from the commer-
cial market.502 Reports state, however, that TEPCO has not purchased cov-
erage for property damage since September 2010.503
As for third party liability, according to the Act on Compensation,
the nuclear operator faces unlimited strict liability and has the obligation
to seek financial security up to 120 billion yen.504 If the damage is caused
by an earthquake or volcanic eruption, the government should indemnify
losses up to the 120 billion yen minimum financial security requirement.505
For damages exceeding this amount, the operator is still liable. However,
if such a natural disaster is characterized as “a grave natural disaster of an
exceptional character,” the liable parties can be exonerated from liability.506
To apply those liability rules to the Fukushima accident, TEPCO’s potential
Review, INDEP. NUCLEAR NEWS (May 4, 2012), http://www.i-nuclear.com/2012/05/04/us-nrc
-will-review-evacuation-zone-expansion-but-separate-from-fukushima-review/.
499 See Elaine Kurtenbach & Shino Yuasa, Anxiety in Tokyo Over Radiation in Tap
Water, BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 23, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews
/D9M59PR00.htm.
500 See Fukushima Nuclear Accident Update Log: Updates of 12 April 2011, INT’L ATOMIC
ENERGY AGENCY (12 Apr. 2011), http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/2011/fukushima
120411.html.
501 See Jacopo Buongiorno, Lesson Learned: The Fukushima Disaster Should Make Nuclear
Energy Safer than Ever, TECH. REV. (Aug. 2012), http://www.technologyreview.com/notebook
/428209/lesson-learned/.
502 Supra Part I.B.
503 Crowhurst & Moore, supra note 114, at 27.
504 Vásquez-Maignan, supra note 471, at 9.
505 See Fukushima—Compensation of Nuclear Damage After Great Earthquake in Japan,
ENFORMABLE NUCLEAR NEWS (Dec. 13, 2011), http://enformable.com/2011/12/fukushima
-compensation-of-nuclear-damage-after-great-earthquake-in-japan/.
506 Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage § 3.
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liability depends on whether the accident will be attributed to “a grave
natural disaster of an exceptional character.”507
The Japanese government did not admit the earthquake and tsu-
nami to be disasters of an “exceptional character.”508 On the contrary, the
government has required TEPCO to compensate the damage it caused.509
Several provisional compensation payments have been made by TEPCO
so far.510 In April 2011, TEPCO decided to pay “Temporary Compensation”
to the evacuated people.511 The amount was set at 1 million yen (about
13,000 USD) per household with more than one person and 750,000 yen
(about 10,000 USD) per individual.512 This amount is considered by many
victims to be insufficient.513 To provide counseling and compensation for the
losses, TEPCO established the Fukushima Nuclear Compensation Office
in April 2011.514 From the end of May of that year, TEPCO started to com-
pensate business operators who engage in agriculture, forestry, and fish-
eries. The government had forced these businesses to suspend shipments,
out of concern for health and safety.515 A third compensation action taken
507 The issue of whether the Fukushima incident is considered such a grave natural disaster
of an exceptional character is as yet undecided. See Weitzdörfer, supra note 317, at 76–77.
Some hold that TEPCO was aware of the danger of an earthquake which could lead to a
nuclear incident since several experts had provided warnings in that respect. Shirouzu &
Dawson, supra note 493. This would be an argument to hold that the earthquake had no
exceptional character; on the other hand, the earthquake with a magnitude of 9.0 was the
strongest so far in Japan as a result of which the question could arise what would then still
be necessary to qualify as “a grave natural disaster of an exceptional character.” Quake
Jolts Eastern Japan, No Tsunami Warning Issued, CHI. TRIB. (Jul. 2, 2012), http://articles
.chicagotribune.com/2012-07-02/news/sns-rt-us-japan-quakebre862039-20120702_1_tsunami
-worst-nuclear-crisis-japan-meteorological-agency; see also Vásquez-Maignan, supra note
471, at 10.
508 See Vásquez-Maignan, supra note 471, at 10.
509 See Outline of the Bill of the Act to Establish Nuclear Damage Compensation Facili-
tation Corporation, MINISTRY OF ECON., TRADE AND INDUSTRY, http://www.meti.go.jp
/english/earthquake/nuclear/roadmap/pdf/20110614_damage_corporation_2.pdf (last visited
Nov. 2, 2012) [hereinafter Nuclear Damage Compensation Outline].
510 Id.
511 CURRENT SITUATIONS UPDATE AFTER MARCH 11 EARTHQUAKE, TOKYO ELECTRIC POWER
COMPANY, available at http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/corpinfo/ir/tool/presen/pdf/110426setsu-e.pdf.
512 Payment of Temporary Compensation for Evacuees, TOKYO ELECTRIC POWER COM-
PANY, http://www.tepco.co.jp/cc/press/11041405-j.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2012); see also
Weitzdörfer, supra note 317, at 62.
513 Weitzdörfer, supra note 317, at 62.
514 It Is About Establishment of “Fukushima Atomic Energy Compensation Counselor’s
Office” as of April 28, 2011, TOMISATO CITY (Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.city.tomisato.lg
.jp.e.cs.hp.transer.com/0000001128.html; see also Tepco Homepage, TOKYO ELECTRIC POWER
COMPANY, http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/index-e.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2012).
515 Nuclear Damage Compensation Outline, supra note 509.
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by TEPCO is to pay compensation to small- and medium-sized enterprises
that have suffered business damage in the evacuation areas.516
After those temporary compensation actions, TEPCO published
a plan on Permanent Compensation for Nuclear Damages on August 30,
2011,517 and a plan on Permanent Indemnification for Nuclear Damages
to Concerned Corporations and Sole Proprietors on September 21, 2011.518
Under those plans, overviews of the compensable damage and standards
are given in accordance with government guidance.519 At this moment the
total amount of the damage caused by the Fukushima incident can be con-
sidered as a moving target. Even now, the number increases every day, so
it is not possible to make meaningful estimates yet.520 However, as this
Article will explain, the amounts mentioned to compensate the victims via
a newly established corporation go in the trillions of yen.521 This clearly
shows that the limited amount of 120 billion yen on the basis of the Act on
Compensation for Nuclear Damage will surely not be sufficient to com-
pensate the victims.
c. Compensating Damage via the Dispute Reconciliation
Committee
To investigate the impact of the Fukushima accident and ascer-
tain the compensable damage, the Dispute Reconciliation Committee for
Nuclear Damage Compensation has been established.522 Eighteen panels
were held between April 15th and December 6th.523 According to the Recon-
ciliation Committee, the Fukushima Accident has had a broad impact on
516 Id.
517 Press Release: Permanent Compensation for Nuclear Damages by the Accident at Fuku-
shima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station and Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station, TOKYO
ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY (Aug. 30, 2011), http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com
/release/11083007-e.html [hereinafter Press Release on Permanent Compensation].
518 Press Release: Permanent Indemnification for Nuclear Damages to Concerned Corpora-
tions and Sole Proprietors Due to the Accident at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station
and Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station, TOKYO ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY (Sept. 21,
2011), available at http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/11092109-e.html [here-
inafter Press Release on Permanent Indemnification].
519 Id.; Press Release on Permanent Compensation, supra note 517.
520 Id.
521 Infra Part II.D.2.e.
522 See Vásquez-Maignan, supra note 471, at 9.
523 See HANDOUTS—COMMITTEE MINUTES—SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS—PROCEEDINGS
DAMAGES NUCLEAR DISPUTE, MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, CULTURE, SPORTS, SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY, http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/shingi/chousa/kaihatu/016/gigi_list/index.htm
[hereinafter HANDOUTS].
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the surrounding residents; agriculture, fishing, and related industries; real
estate prices, and so on.524 The Reconciliation Committee has published
a preliminary guidance, secondary guidance with an added guidance, and
interim guidance with an added guidance on the scope of compensable
damage.525 Their determination of compensable damage accounted for the
compensation for the Tokai-mura accident and whether the compensable
losses were similar in scope and character.526 It also defined compensable
damage according by territorial zones.527 According to the Preliminary
Guideline to Determine the Scope of Compensable Losses, those zones are
divided into three categories.528 The first category contains areas under the
evacuation order, areas under a shelter-in-place order, and the planned and
emergency evacuation areas which are determined pursuant to the Act on
Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness.529 The
second category contains areas dangerous for navigation, as determined
by the Coast Guard. The third category contains the areas determined as
shipping restriction areas.530
For victims seeking recovery under the first category, compensable
damage includes evacuation expenses, business damage, lost income, loss
or reduced value of property, medical examination expenses, property in-
spection expenses, personal injuries, and mental suffering.531 For areas
falling into the second and third categories, business damage and loss in-
come are compensable.532 The scope is further broadened in the following
524 PROGRESS OF THE “ROADMAP FOR IMMEDIATE ACTIONS FOR THE ASSISTANCE OF RESIDENTS
AFFECTED BY THE NUCLEAR INCIDENT,” NUCLEAR EMERGENCY RESPONSE HEADQUARTERS 5–6
(Oct. 17, 2011), available at http://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/roadmap
/pdf/111017_assistance_02.pdf.
525 The preliminary guidance was issued on April 28; the secondary guidance was issued
on May 31, and added guidance was issued on June 20, interim guidance was issued on
August 5, and the added guidance on interim guidance on December 6. See HANDOUTS,
supra note 523; see also McNeill, supra note 406.
526 HANDOUTS, supra note 523.
527 Interim Guidance on the Determination of Compensation Scope for Fukushima Accident,
MINISTRY OF EDUC., CULTURE, SPORTS, SCI. AND TECH., http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu
/shingi/chousa/kaihatu/016/houkoku/_icsFiles/afieldfile/2011/08/17/1309452/_1_2.pdf
[hereinafter Interim Guidance].
528 Id.
529 Id.
530 Id.
531 Id.
532 Preliminary Guidance on the Determination of Compensation Scope for Fukushima
Accident, MINISTRY OF EDUC., CULTURE, SPORTS, SCI. AND TECH., http://www.mext.go.jp
/b_menu/shingi/chousa/kaihatu/016/houkoku/_icsfiles/afieldfile/2011/04/28/1305640_1.pdf
[hereinafter Preliminary Guidance].
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guidance. For example, damage due to governmental instructions—like
shipping restrictions or mandatory property inspections—is also compen-
sable.533 Compensable damage also extends to economic damage to reputa-
tion, indirect damage, damage by radiation exposure, and others.534 Under
the category of damage to reputation, corporations and sole proprietors at
specified areas or selling listed items in those areas and suffering damages
from loss of sales because of the accident can claim for loss of revenue and
reasonable additional costs.535 For indirect damage, corporations and sole
proprietors who have a relationship with the primary damaged party that
is irreplaceable because of the nature of the business, can also claim for
business damage.536 Besides, the employees of those corporations and sole
proprietors can also claim damage due to incapacity.537 The added interim
guidance further broadens the scope to allow for compensation for the
damage caused by voluntary evacuations.538 According to the government
guidance, TEPCO also stipulates the standards for compensation for those
different categories.539
It is worth noting that the compensable damage determined by the
Dispute Reconciliation Committee is quite broad. It does not only allow
compensation for personal damage and property damage, but also for some
pure economic loss.540 For example, under the title of business damage,
physical damage is not a necessary requirement for awarding damages—
damage due to rumors and indirect damage are sufficient.541
In response to the nuclear damage, Japan chose an administrative
system rather than a judicial system as the primary compensation instru-
ment.542 Compensation is awarded according to categories of geographic
areas and government orders. The standards to identify compensable losses
533 Id.
534 Id.
535 Id.
536 Id.
537 See Interim Guidance, supra note 527.
538 Id.
539 See Overview of the Compensation Standards for the Major Categories of Damages,
TOKYO ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY, http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release
/betu11_e/images/110830e19.pdf [hereinafter Overview of Compensation]; Overview of
the Indemnification Standards for the Major Categories of Damages in Corporations and
Sole Proprietors, TOKYO ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY, http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp
-com/release/betu11_e/images/110921e13.pdf [hereinafter Overview of Indemnification].
540 Overview of Indemnification, supra note 539.
541 Id.
542 See generally Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage, supra note 330.
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are also set by the administrative authority.543 This approach can avoid the
substantial hurdles in the tort system in awarding compensation for nu-
clear damage. In the Act on Compensation, no specific hurdles have been
introduced in the establishment of nuclear liability, while general obstacles
in the tort system can prevent sufficient compensation for nuclear victims.
For example, in Japanese law, there is no general rule which bars the
recovery of pure economic loss.544 In practice however, the claim for pure
economic loss is not easy either because of the difficulties in proving neg-
ligence or because of the remoteness of the economic loss.545 Even for
personal injury, causation is not always easy to establish because of evi-
dentiary uncertainties. These hurdles may not be easy to overcome in the
tort system, but can be more easily resolved in the administrative system.
In addition to personal injury, property damage and economic losses
which often draw more attention in the case of a nuclear accident, serious
environmental damage can also arise. The building, soil, and vegetation
may be exposed to high radiation spread by the accident and create a fur-
ther threat to human health.546 The Fukushima accident is classified as an
INES level 7, which means that it has had significant off-site impacts and
environmental damage.547 However, as shown above, the compensable dam-
age determined by the Dispute Reconciliation Committee makes no direct
reference to the concept of “environmental damage.”548
d. Clean-Up of Environmental Damage
How the polluted environment will be cleaned up or compensated
remains to be seen. Some temporary policies have been adopted by the
Government Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters (“GNER-HQs”).549
543 See Overview of Compensation, supra note 539.
544 See Yoshihisa Nomi, Tort Liability for Pure Economic Loss in Japan, in JAPANESE
REPORTS FOR THE XVII INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW (UTRECHT, 16–22
JULY 2006) 63–64.
545 See Nomi, supra note 544, at 75–76.
546 See Frequently Asked Questions, UNITED NATIONS SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE ON THE
EFFECTS OF ATOMIC RADIATION, http://www.unscear.org/unscear/en/faq.html (last visited
Nov. 2, 2012).
547 See IAEA Briefing on Fukushima Nuclear Accident, INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
(Apr. 12, 2011), http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/2011/fukushima120411.html.
548 Supra Part II.D.1.a.
549 See INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, ADDITIONAL REPORT OF THE JAPANESE GOV’T TO THE
IAEA: THE ACCIDENT AT TEPCO’S FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR POWER STATION 18–24 (Sept. 2011), 
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The GNER-HQs published the “Basic Concept for Pushing Ahead with
Decontamination” and the “Basic Policy for Emergency Response on Decon-
tamination Works.”550 Those documents set the current goals and working
guidelines for decontamination for the next two years.551 The long-term
decontamination work was prescribed under a law enacted on August 26,
2011, the Act on Special Measures concerning the Handling of Environmen-
tal Pollution by Radioactive Materials Discharged by NPS Associated with
the Tohoku District—Off the Pacific Ocean Earthquake that Occurred on
March 11, 2011.552 The Act creates a framework for decontamination mea-
sures for the pollution caused by the Fukushima accident, and it involves
the national government, local governments, and nuclear operators.553 It
is worth noting that rather than restoring and compensating for the dam-
age to the environment itself, this Act focuses on reducing the influence
of environmental pollution on human health and the living environment.554
In the other words, this Act does not aim at providing compensation for the
complete cleanup of the environment; only the measures related to reduc-
ing human impacts are covered.555 The national government is responsible
for setting decontamination policies.556 Local governments shall cooperate
with the national government and shall also take some initiatives them-
selves.557 Nuclear operators shall dispose the radioactive wastes and coop-
erate with the government to decontaminate the polluted environment.558
The financial duty to decontaminate the polluted environment is
formulated in the recent Act as an obligation of various stakeholders.559 The
Act provides that the national government and local public authorities
shall take financial measures and other measures to promote the policies
related with the handling of the environmental pollution by radioactive
available at http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/fukushima/japan-report2/japanreport
120911.pdf.
550 Id.
551 See id.
552 See Act on Special Measures Concerning the Handling of Environmental Pollution by
Radioactive Materials Discharged by NPS Associated with the Tohoku District—Off the
Pacific Ocean Earthquake that Occurred on March 11, 2011 (2011), available at http://www
.mext.go.jp/b_menu/shingi/chousa/kaihatu/016/shiryo/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2011/09/21/1311103
_13_2.pdf (original source in Japanese) [hereinafter Act on Environmental Pollution].
553 Id. art. 1.
554 Id.
555 See id.
556 Id.
557 Id.
558 Act on Environmental Pollution art. 43–44.
559 Id. art. 43–45.
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materials discharged by the accident.560 However, the Act equally makes
clear that the liable nuclear operators shall also compensate within their
capacity.561 Experts on nuclear law in Japan also confirm that on the basis
of the new Act, financing decontamination is considered a joint responsibil-
ity of the operators, the national government, and local public authorities.562
e. Financing of the Losses via the Nuclear Damage Compensation
Facilitation Corporation
Beyond simply defining the scope of compensable damage, the
question exists how this compensation can be financed. As was indicated
above, nuclear damage caused by a natural disaster is excluded from the
insurance policy provided by JAEIP.563 Thus, the insurance industry does
not seem to be seriously impacted by this accident. The government may
have to indemnify the losses up to 120 billion yen.564 The remainder of the
damage may still create a challenge to the financial capacity of TEPCO.
According to the Act on Compensation, if the operator’s liability exceeds
the amount of financial security and the government deems it necessary
in order to attain the objectives of the Act, the government shall give aid
to the operator.565 However, whether and to what extent aid will be given
depends on the government’s decision. Because of the significant impact
of the Fukushima accident and the catastrophic nature of the damage, it
will be difficult for TEPCO alone to provide full compensation.
To ensure a prompt compensation of the damage caused by the
Fukushima accident, the government prepared a law to address compen-
sation through the creation of a corporation in June 2011.566 The Act to
Establish the Nuclear Damage Compensation Facilitation Corporation was
passed on August 3, 2011.567 The Act has three aims: ensuring the prompt
560 Id. art. 43.
561 Id. art. 44.
562 Shimada Interview, supra note 67.
563 Supra Part II.B.1.
564 Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage § 3.
565 Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage § 16.
566 Japan’s Parliament Approves TEPCO Compensation Plan, BBC NEWS (Aug. 3, 2011,
6:48 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-14383832; Nuclear Damage Compensation
Outline, supra note 509.
567 See Outline of the Nuclear Damage Compensation Facilitation Corporation Act,
MINISTRY OF ECON., TRADE AND INDUSTRY 1 (Aug. 2011), available at http://www.meti
.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/roadmap/pdf/20111012_nuclear_damages_2.pdf
[hereinafter METI Outline].
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and proper nuclear damage compensation for affected people, stabilizing
the nuclear power station to prevent adverse effects on life and commerce
in the surrounding area, and maintaining a stable supply of electricity.568
To realize those aims, the Act establishes a Nuclear Damage Compensation
Facilitation Corporation (“the Corporation”) and a system of financing the
compensation for damage.569 The Corporation will receive contributions
from nuclear operators to cover the costs of operation, and reserve funds to
prepare for compensation.570 The victims still need to make a claim against
the liable operator, and the liable operator needs to make the payment to
the victims. However, the Corporation can facilitate the compensation and
“provide . . . necessary information and advice” to the affected people.571
If the liable operator needs assistance, the Corporation can provide two
forms: ordinary financial assistance, which can be given after a resolution
of the management committee of the Corporation; and special financial
assistance, which needs to be approved by the competent minister.572 To
obtain the special financial assistance, the Corporation and the operator
need to formulate a special business plan.573 Under this plan, the govern-
ment will issue government bonds to the Corporation and the Corporation
will grant the necessary funds to the nuclear operator.574 The Corporation
can also get government-backed support from financial institutions. After
getting this support, the liable nuclear operator pays special contributions
to the Corporation.575 Other non-affected nuclear operators also need to
pay general contributions based on the principle of “mutual support.”576
From the contributions, the Corporation repays the national treasury and
financial institutions.577 One issue worth noting here is that the Corpora-
tion does not only provide assistance for the compensation of third-party
damage, but also for the expenses of stabilizing the power plant and sus-
taining a stable supply of electricity.578 The compensation under the new
system can be summarized as follows:
568 Id.
569 Id.
570 Id.
571 Id. at 3.
572 See METI Outline, supra note 567, at 2.
573 Id. at 2.
574 Id. at 2–3.
575 Id.
576 Id. at 1.
577 METI Outline, supra note 567, at 3.
578 Id. at 1.
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TABLE 9: COMPENSATION SUPPORT BY NUCLEAR DAMAGE COMPENSATION
FACILITATION CORPORATION579
This Act established a mutual support “pooling system” to pro-
vide coverage for nuclear liability after the Fukushima accident.580 Some
scholars advocate pooling as a useful instrument to finance the compen-
sation of catastrophic losses while preserving preventive incentives.581 The
mutual support system established in Japan has some characteristics dif-
ferent from the practice in other jurisdictions. In both Germany and the
U.S., where resource pooling between nuclear operators has been estab-
lished, pooling is done before accidents happen.582 However, the ex post
system established in Japan cannot create incentives among operators to
monitor each other. Unlike the American and German regimes, under the
Japanese system the Corporation is not only financed by nuclear operators,
but also by government compensation bonds and government-guaranteed
bonds.583 If those funds are financed without a market price, this system
will look more like a bailout of TEPCO than a pooling system to prevent
and compensate for future damage.
579 Compensation Support by Nuclear Damage Compensation Facilitation Corporation,
MINISTRY OF ECON., TRADE AND INDUSTRY, available at http://www.meti.go.jp/english
/earthquake/nuclear/roadmap/pdf/20111012_nuclear_damages_1.pdf.
580 Nuclear Damage Compensation Outline, supra note 509.
581 See Michael G. Faure & Tom Vanden Borre, Compensating Nuclear Damage: A Compar-
ative Economic Analysis of the U.S. and International Liability Schemes, 33 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 219, 222 (2008); Norbert Pelzer, International Pooling of Operators’
Funds: An Option to Increase the Amount of Financial Security to Cover Nuclear Liability?,
79 NUCLEAR L. BULLETIN 37, 51 (2007).
582 See Pelzer, supra note 581, at 49.
583 METI Outline, supra note 567, at 1–2.
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TEPCO and the Corporation have submitted a special business
plan to the government and the plan was approved on November 4, 2011.584
According to this plan, the Corporation will deliver 1 billion yen (12.8 mil-
lion USD), less the amount available through indemnity agreement to help
TEPCO to compensate victims in the fiscal year 2011.585 As a price, TEPCO
needs to cut costs of 2.5 trillion yen (32 billion USD) over the following ten
years.586 As of today, TEPCO has spent 158 billion yen as “provisional com-
pensation” to the nuclear victims, and the permanent compensation will
be even higher.587 To promote the compensation to victims, the Corporation
transferred 560 billion yen (7.2 billion USD) to TEPCO on November 4,
2011 and another 120 billion yen (1.5 billion USD) pursuant to the indem-
nity agreement on November 22, 2011.588 This financial assistance given
under the special business plan does not contain the costs of decontamina-
tion and decommissioning of the nuclear reactors.589
The need for further assistance may be increased according to the
progress of compensation payouts and a reasonable estimate of decontami-
nation expenses. The approved special business plan is only intended to be
an emergency measure; a more comprehensive special business plan is
being prepared.590 To ensure the full compensation, the Japanese govern-
ment has decided to issue government bonds of 2 trillion yen (26 billion
USD) to help TEPCO to pay compensation, and is considering approving a
supplementary budget of 3 trillion yen (38 billion USD).591 This plan has
been heavily criticized. Some think that if the government support is not
registered as a loan on TEPCO’s balance sheet, the tax payers will ulti-
mately bear the risk; there is also concern about nuclear safety, which may
be compromised as a means for cutting costs for TEPCO in the following
years.592 Others doubt whether TEPCO should continue to exist at all.593
584 Vásquez-Maignan, supra note 471, at 11.
585 TOKYO ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY, THE SPECIAL BUSINESS PLAN: “THE EMERGENCY
SPECIAL BUSINESS PLAN” FOR “EMPATHY-BASED COMPENSATION PAYOUTS” 49 (Oct. 8, 2011),
available at http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu11_e/images/111104e3.pdf
[hereinafter SPECIAL BUSINESS PLAN].
586 Id. at 5.
587 Vásquez-Maignan, supra note 471, at 10.
588 Id. at 11.
589 See SPECIAL BUSINESS PLAN, supra note 585, at 48–49.
590 Id. at 48.
591 Id. at 49.
592 See Japan’s Nuclear Conundrum: The $64 Billion Question, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 5,
2011), available at http://www.economist.com/node/21536600.
593 See Akihiro Sawa, Should TEPCO Continue to Exist?, JAPAN TODAY (Aug. 10, 2011,
11:14 PM), http://www.japantoday.com/category/commentary/view/should-tepco-continue
-to-exist.
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E. Evaluation
The Japanese system for compensation of nuclear damage has a few
striking features which also result from the fact that Japan did not join
any international conventions.594 The imposition of a strict liability regime
for nuclear accidents is certainly in line with suggestions in literature.595
However, it is clear that the main goal of the Act on Compensation for
Nuclear Damage was, as the Act states, to reconcile the interests of po-
tential victims with the interests of the nuclear industry.596 There is a long
tradition of interconnections between industry and bureaucracy in Japan,
and as a result the nuclear industry has been successful in implementing
its wishes through the legislature.597
1. Learning from Fukushima: Unlimited Liability and Problems
with Channeling
The unlimited liability of the nuclear power plant operator is
undoubtedly a positive feature of the compensation system in Japan.
International conventions and many national laws often have caps on the
liability of operators, which functionally qualify as a type of subsidy.598
However, the extent to which unlimited liability truly leads to a full exter-
nalization of nuclear accident costs is not clear. In a recent article, Mark
Ramseyer is very critical, believing that earthquakes are so common in
Japan that TEPCO decided to build its reactor at the site which is vulnera-
ble to earthquake risks because it knew it “would not pay the full cost of
a melt-down anyway.”599 He holds that a nuclear operator is, under the
Japanese system, able to externalize liability since liability will reach a
de facto cap at the value of its assets.600
One particular striking aspect of the Fukushima case is that
TEPCO had apparently placed its back-up generators in the basement
594 See Vásquez-Maignan, supra note 471, at 9.
595 See Japan’s Nuclear Conundrum: The $64 billion question, supra note 592.
596 Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage § 1.
597 On these relations between industry and bureaucracy, see William W. Grimes,
Reassessing Amakudari: What Do We Know and How Do We Know It?, 31 J. OF JAPANESE
STUD. 385, 388 (2005).
598 On this subsidy, see generally Michael G. Faure & Karine Fiore, An Economic Analysis
of a Nuclear Liability Subsidy, 26 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 419, 427 (2009) [hereinafter Faure
& Fiore, An Economic Analysis].
599 Ramseyer, supra note 408, at 1.
600 Id. at 1, 18, 23.
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under the turbine building; as a result, the plant would be without a cool-
ing system in case of a tsunami or flood.601 It may not immediately be clear
to what extent this can be blamed either on TEPCO itself as operator or on
General Electric, who designed the Fukushima plant.602 If the wrongful
placement was due to negligence on the side of General Electric, a pain-
ful aspect of the nuclear liability regime in Japan, but also worldwide,
becomes clear: the channeling of liability. According to the Japanese Act
on Compensation, only the operator of the nuclear power plant can be held
liable, thus excluding liability of other potential parties that contributed
to the risk—in this particular case, perhaps General Electric.603
This channeling of liability has been largely criticized in the liter-
ature.604 The economists argue that nuclear suppliers, transporters and
other parties should also be responsible for nuclear damage.605 Since some
of these parties—transporters in particular—may have serious risks of
insolvency, a proposal was made to make operators, suppliers, and trans-
porters jointly and severally liable.606 Under such a proposal, the insol-
vency problem would be alleviated and other parties would have incentives
for mutual monitoring.607
2. Inefficiencies Resulting from Corporate Limited Liability and
Private Interests
Examining the TEPCO case, one can argue that the non-capped
liability in the Japanese system cannot guarantee efficient deterrence by
itself. Though the Act on Compensation does not set a cap on the poten-
tial liability of nuclear operators, the corporate structure only exposes
them to risk up to the value of their assets.608 In this situation, a finan-
cial guarantee is important to ensure efficient deterrence. In Japan, the
required financial security is set at 120 billion yen.609 This amount is pro-
vided through a combination of liability insurance, for which the operator
601 See id. at 16.
602 See Kurczy, supra note 479.
603 Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage § 4.
604 See, e.g., Tom Vanden Borre, Channeling of Liability: A Few Juridical and Economic
Views on an Inadequate Legal Construction, in CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NUCLEAR
ENERGY LAW: HARMONIZING LEGISLATION IN CEEC/NIS 13, 22–23 (Nathalie L.J.T. Horbach
ed., 1999).
605 See Watabe, supra note 346, at 222–23.
606 See Vanden Borre, supra note 604, at 20–21.
607 See Watabe, supra note 346, at 225.
608 See Ramseyer, supra note 408, at 3.
609 Id. at 8.
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will pay a premium, and an indemnity agreement with government, for
which a fee will be paid as well.610
Compensation under this indemnity agreement is not a mere sub-
sidy. However, the indemnity fee charged for government coverage is cer-
tainly not market-based. On the contrary, the fee is fixed, and therefore
not risk-related.611 Moreover, though the operator remains liable beyond
the insured amount of 120 billion yen (except when the incident would be
qualified as a natural disaster of an exceptional character) the exposure
to liability of the operator is de facto limited to its assets.612 Beyond that
amount, Japanese law provides that government may use its discretionary
powers to “take measures,” meaning that it will intervene to compensate
victims. In that case a lack of full internalization of the accident costs re-
mains a problem.613 This still raises the question to what extent a nuclear
operator like TEPCO is fully liable for accident costs and to what extent
liability rules do provide adequate incentives for taking preventive mea-
sures with a view to cost internalization.
A critical analysis of the development of the nuclear industry shows
that poor safety controls in the nuclear industry in Japan can be explained
from a private interest perspective. As discussed earlier, since nuclear op-
erators are protected under the principle of limited liability in corporate
law, they only have to pay for the potential losses up to their own assets.614
Thus TEPCO has chosen to prioritize political considerations in siting
reactors over geologic ones, and built their reactors at sites vulnerable to
earthquake risks.615
The question can then be asked why government has allowed such
a choice of site and failed to order a more tsunami-resistant construction
and renovation. The bureaucrats and politicians are supposed to serve the
public interest and guarantee better nuclear safety.616 However, this is not
always the case. Bureaucrats are self-interested. Nuclear regulation is an
intangible good for the public, who need better nuclear controls for their
own safety, but deregulation is a visible, targeted, and tangible private good
for the nuclear industry. Thus the nuclear industry has more incentives
than the public to lobby for lax oversight.617 Considering the inefficiency of
610 See Act on Indemnity Agreements for Compensation of Nuclear Damage §§ 2–4, 6.
611 Id. § 6.
612 See Ramseyer, supra note 408, at 17–18.
613 Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage §§ 16–17.
614 See Ramseyer, supra note 408, at 18.
615 Id. at 21.
616 Cf. id. at 19.
617 Ramseyer, supra note 408, at 19.
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limited liability under private ownership of nuclear installations, govern-
ment ownership might be an alternative. However, literature also shows
that government ownership may not be ideal for guaranteeing nuclear
safety, as a result of the influence of regulated electricity prices, “Not In
My Back Yard” attitudes and the progressive tax regime.618
Though government and bureaucrats failed to produce efficient reg-
ulation of the nuclear industry, one may still argue that the independent
judges can play a role in barring construction projects at tectonic fault
lines, or granting the victims sufficient compensation to create better deter-
rent incentives for nuclear operators. However, this has not been the case.
For example, several challenges have been filed regarding a variety of activ-
ities involving the Fukushima nuclear plants since its construction.619 In
the 1970s, local challenges were made against a landfill license granted to
fill in part of a nearby bay, and against the reactor license.620 Area residents
also petitioned to shut the reactor down in 1989 after the cooling system in
one of the Daini reactors failed.621 However, all the claims were dismissed
for lack of standing or because the judges deemed the plant safe enough.622
There are similar dismissals in cases involving other nuclear power plants
in Japan.623
In addition to claims aimed at ending the operation of nuclear reac-
tors, as discussed above, compensation claims are quite often, unsuccess-
ful.624 This failure may partly be explained by the difficulties presented by
the tort system, like problems establishing causation due to scientific uncer-
tainties or the remoteness between certain kinds of damage and the nuclear
accident. However, a private interest analysis shows that like bureaucrats,
judges also seek to protect and advance their own interests.625 The cabi-
net can ensure favorable judgments for them through the nomination of
corporate-friendly judges to the supreme court and through manipulation
of the judicial promotion system.626 This may be another explanation for
the nuclear-friendly judgments in Japan.
618 Id. at 23.
619 Id. at 9.
620 Id.
621 Id.
622 See Ramseyer, supra note 408, at 10.
623 See, e.g., id. at 10–13.
624 Id. at 15.
625 Id. at 20.
626 Id. For additional analysis about judicial independence and political influence on judges
in Japan, see J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric Bennett Rasmusen, Judicial Independence in Civil
Law Regimes: The Evidence from Japan, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 259 (1997).
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III. COMPARISON WITH OTHER COMPENSATION SYSTEMS
It may be useful to conclude this paper addressing the compensation
for the victims of the tsunami of March 3, 2011 and the subsequent nuclear
incident at Fukushima by briefly putting the Japanese compensation sys-
tem in an international perspective. Of course time does not permit a full
fledged comparative analysis,627 but it may be interesting to briefly sketch
to what extent the compensation system in Japan is in line with certain
international trends or deviating from them. This may also provide an
occasion to ask the question to what extent the compensation system in
Japan may provide international lessons for other legal systems strug-
gling with the financial compensation for victims of catastrophes or the
compensation for victims of nuclear accidents.
A. Compensation for Victims of Natural Disasters
As far as the compensation of victims of natural disasters is con-
cerned, four types of compensation systems can be loosely distinguished.628
This brief survey considers insurance policies for terrorism as well. The
low-frequency, high-magnitude nature of terrorist attacks demonstrates
a risk level analogous to nuclear disasters for the purpose of comparing
compensation systems.
1. A first possibility is to rely on liability and social
security already in place and implement no further
regulatory measures. Such an approach is largely fol-
lowed in some European legal systems like Germany,
Italy and Sweden.629
2. A second approach is to mandate that first party in-
surance coverage be extended to damages caused by
a variety of natural disasters. This approach is used
in France.630 A similar system is being discussed in
Belgium and the Netherlands.631
627 For a more thorough comparative analysis of financial compensation for victims of catas-
trophes see FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHES: A COMPARATIVE
LEGAL APPROACH (Michael Faure & Ton Hartlief eds., 2006).
628 See, e.g., TRANSBOUNDARY RISK MANAGEMENT (Joanne Linnerooth-Bayer et al. eds., 2001).
629 Introduction, FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHES: A COMPARATIVE
LEGAL APPROACH 2 (Michael Faure & Ton Hartlief eds., 2006).
630 See Olivier Moreteau & Fabien Lafay, France: Liability for Acts of Terrorism Under
French Law, in TERRORISM, TORT AND INSURANCE: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY 29, 30
(Bernhard A. Koch ed., 2004).
631 See Veronique Bruggeman et al., Remodelling Reparation: Changes in the Compensation
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3. A third possibility is to create a compensation fund
for victims that would provide partial compensation.
A disaster fund like that exists in Austria to respond
to terrorist attacks.632
4. A fourth option is to develop public-private part-
nerships, whereby the state intervenes to facilitate
private insurance. These models are typically found
in the U.S.; examples include the California Earth-
quake Authority (“CEA”) and the National Flood
Insurance Plan (“NFIP”) for Flooding.633
Looking at international trends one could hold that the first
system—liability law—is rarely used for natural catastrophes for the
simple reason that there is usually no liable tortfeasor that can be easily
identified and sued. The second model—an extension of mandatory disas-
ter coverage in addition to first party insurance backed up with reinsur-
ance by the state—is increasingly popular.634 This model has substantial
support in academic literature635 and is becoming increasingly popular at
the policy level in a number of countries, including the United States.636
Mandatory disaster coverage is advocated since, as a result of a variety of
behavioral biases, victims do not typically purchase disaster coverage even
if it would increase their expected utility.637 The role of government is also
changing. In the past, governments would rather provide ad hoc compen-
sation to victims of catastrophes.638 This model is, however, increasingly
of Victims of Natural Catastrophes in Belgium and the Netherlands, 35 DISASTERS 766,
771 (2011).
632 See Dagmar Hinghofer-Szalkay & Bernhard A. Koch, Austria: Liability for Acts of
Terrorism under Austrian Law, in TERRORISM, TORT LAW AND INSURANCE: A COMPARATIVE
SURVEY 5, 7 (Bernhard A. Koch ed., 2004).
633 The National Flood Insurance Program, FEMA, http://www.fema.gov/national-flood
-insurance-program (last visited Nov. 2, 2012); CALIFORNIA EARTHQUAKE AUTHORITY,
http://www.earthquakeauthority.com/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2012). For discussion of public-
private partnerships and examples, see Veronique Bruggeman et al., The Government as
Reinsurer of Catastrophic Risks?, 53 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 369 (2010).
634 Howard Kunreuther, The Case for Comprehensive Disaster Insurance, 11 J. L. & ECON.
133, 151–52, 154 (1968).
635 See id.; see also Reimund Schwarze & Gert Wagner, In the Aftermath of Dresden: New
Directions in German Flood Insurance, 29 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 154, 154 (2004).
636 See Kunreuther, supra note 634, at 162.
637 See Michael Faure & Veronique Bruggeman, Catastrophic Risks and First-Party
Insurance, 15 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 14–16 (2008).
638 Saul Levmore & Kyle D. Logue, Insuring Against Terrorism—And Crime, 102 MICH.
L. REV. 268, 287 (2003).
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criticized as it would lead to a so-called moral hazard, by providing per-
verse incentives to victims not to seek insurance coverage.639
How does the compensation for victims of earthquakes in Japan
compare with these international tendencies? Japan seems to rely largely
on insurance solutions, which allow substantial flexibility. Earthquake in-
surance can be obtained via traditional insurance companies, with rein-
surance by JER.640 There is also limited intervention by the government in
the reinsurance of the earthquake risk.641 In addition, earthquake insur-
ance for households is also possible via Kyosai.642
As was made clear above while evaluating the compensation system
for earthquakes643 the compensation system in Japan has many strengths.
Although there are doubts about the competitiveness of the market, earth-
quake insurance seems to be widely available in Japan. This is different
than in some countries (like the Netherlands) where, as a result of a cartel
agreement between insurers, particular natural disasters like flooding are
simply not covered by insurance at all without endorsement.644 Another
positive is that apparently, to some extent (at least for private commercial
insurance), risk-related premiums are charged. This means that the pre-
miums charged are based not only on the earthquake risk at the location
of the particular dwelling, but also related to the riskiness of the particular
construction based on construction techniques.645 The advantage of such
a risk-based system is that risk differentiation can take place and accord-
ing to which incentives for prevention can be provided: risk mitigation can
be rewarded with lower premiums.
The intervention of government in the reinsurance scheme has
been criticized in some economic literature as an inefficient subsidy which
dilutes the development of marked-based solutions.646 Others, however,
639 This is strongly advocated by Richard Epstein and Louis Kaplow. Richard Epstein,
Catastrophic Responses to Catastrophic Risks, 12 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 287 (1996);
Louis Kaplow, Incentives and Government Relief for Risk, 4 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 167
(1991); see also Raschky & Weck-Hanneman, supra note 299, at 321.
640 ESTIMATING INSURED LOSSES FROM THE 2011 TOHOKU, JAPAN EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI,
RISK MANAGEMENT SOLUTIONS 6 (2011), available at http://www.rms.com/Publications
/2011TohokuReport_041111.pdf.
641 See id.
642 Id.
643 See supra Part I.E.
644 See Michael G. Faure, Financial Compensation for Victims of Catastrophes: A Law and
Economics Perspective, 29 J.L. & POL’Y 339, 347 (2007).
645 See supra Part I.E.1.
646 See Levmore & Logue, supra note 638, at 303; Anne Gron & Alan O. Sykes, A Role for
Government?, REGULATION, Winter 2002–2003, at 48.
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argue that such an intervention is advantageous since the government
“has the capacity to diversify the risk over the entire population and to
spread past losses to future generations.”647 The intervention of the gov-
ernment as a reinsurer of last resort also has the advantage that it stim-
ulates the functioning of insurance markets and avoids the moral hazard
which results from government-awarded compensation.
Indeed, there are still programs of government support,648 but this
support is relatively limited to condolence grants or to limited support for
rebuilding the lives of disaster victims. Government support seems to focus
specifically on immediate relief after the disaster, and only to a limited ex-
tent on compensation.649 However, the various government relief programs
seem to come on top of the insurance schemes and could to some extent cre-
ate a moral hazard, meaning that incentives for investing in risk-reducing
measures or incentives to take out insurance coverage may be diluted.
The most problematic aspect of the compensation system is that
insurance is not mandatory but voluntary.650 As we indicated above, in-
surance coverage for earthquake risk is, in Japan, relatively limited.651
The perverse incentives resulting from the voluntary insurance scheme
may play a role in Japan as well, causing a larger need for victims to call
on other types of government support.
However, even though the voluntary character of the earthquake
insurance could be criticized, Japan is surely not the only legal system
which does not have mandatory coverage for this type of natural disaster.652
In the U.S., where many insurance systems have been developed with gen-
erous government support (such as the California Earthquake Authority
and the National Flood Insurance Plan), insurance coverage is still vol-
untary, leading to serious problems of underinsurance.653 This is why,
647 Howard Kunreuther & Erwann Michel-Kerjan, Policy Watch: Challenges for Terrorism
Risk Insurance in the United States 16 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 10870, 2004).
648 See supra Part I.D.
649 See supra Part I.E.3.
650 See supra Part I.E.4.
651 Erik Holm, Insurers Face Steep Losses, Though Not Heaviest Share, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 11,
2011, 6:20 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870359780457619438264
8935082.html.
652 George Zanjani, Public versus Private Underwriting of Catastrophe Risk: Lessons from the
California Earthquake Authority, in RISKING HOUSE AND HOME: DISASTERS, CITIES, PUBLIC
POLICY 5 (John M. Quigley & Larry A. Rosenthal eds., 2008), available at http://irm.wharton
.upenn.edu/S07-Zanjani.pdf (describing optional earthquake insurance in California).
653 See id. at 19–20.
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also in the U.S., at least one scholar has repeatedly pleaded in favor of
comprehensive disaster insurance, as a particular response to disasters
like Hurricane Katrina.654 Even though the voluntary character of the in-
surance scheme in Japan could be criticized, Japan is certainly not out of
line in the international context, as many more legal systems are reluc-
tant to introduce mandatory insurance.
B. Nuclear Accidents
1. Criticisms of the International Regime
Two international treaty regimes regulate the civil liability for
damage caused by nuclear accidents.655 The first treaty regime was estab-
lished under the auspices of the Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development, and consisted of the Paris Convention on Third Party
Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, adopted in July 1960 (the “Paris
Convention”) and the Brussels Convention Supplementary to the Paris
Convention, adopted in January 1963 (the “Brussels Supplementary
Convention”).656 The second nuclear liability treaty regime was developed
under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency (“IAEA”)
in the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, enacted
in May 1963 (the “Vienna Convention” or “IAEA Convention”).657 These
international regimes have been commented on in detail in legal literature
and have also been the subject of much criticism.658
Criticism has coalesced around several main points. One aspect is
the exclusive civil liability of the operator of the nuclear power plant, often
referred to as the channeling of liability.659 The channeling of liability
654 See generally Howard Kunreuther & Mark Pauly, Rules Rather than Discretion: Lessons
from Hurricane Katrina, 33 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 101 (2006).
655 See NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE: AN INTERNATIONAL
OVERVIEW 43 (1994).
656 Id. The OECD was then known as the Organization for European Economic Cooperation
(“OEEC”).
657 Id.
658 Tom Vanden Borre, Shifts in Governance in Compensation for Nuclear Damage: 20 Years
After Chernobyl, in SHIFTS IN COMPENSATION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE 261, 303, 305
(Michael Faure & Albert Verheij eds., 2007).
659 Michael Faure & Karine Fiore, The civil liability of European nuclear operators: which
coverage for the new 2004 protocols? Evidence from France, 8 INT’L ENVTL. AGREEMENTS
227, 229–30 (2008) [hereinafter Faure & Fiore, The Civil Liability].
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means that only the operator of the nuclear power plant can be held lia-
ble to compensate for a nuclear accident.660 This rule is debatable from an
economic perspective, since channeling excludes liability of others who
could have contributed to the risk as well.661
A second aspect highly criticized in the literature is the financial cap
on liability.662 Pursuant to the conventions, the nuclear operator can be held
liable in case of an accident only up to a certain amount. “The amount was
first fixed by the Paris Convention in 1960, and has been modified many
times since.”663 For example, before the last modification protocol of the
Paris and Brussels Conventions, the operator’s liability limit in a country
like France was fixed at € 91 million (116 million USD).664 The cap was re-
cently set at € 700 million (893 million USD), but this change, dating from
2004, has not entered into force yet.665 The criticism is that the amount
may still be largely insufficient to cover the victims of an accident.
However, and here lies the source of the third criticism, “the
Brussels Convention provides a complementary mechanism of compensa-
tion based on public funds” for damage exceeding these caps.666 This mech-
anism applies in cases where the amounts fixed by the Paris Convention
would be too low.667 The Brussels Convention adds two layers of risk insu-
lation, one consisting of aid by the national state and a next layer consisting
of aid by all parties to the convention.668 Since the precise amount depends
upon national implementation, the amount of available compensation also
differs. For example in France the total amount available for victims under
the Paris and Brussels Conventions consisted of € 381 million.669 After the
modification protocol (when it would enter into force) the total amount of
coverage would be € 1.5 billion.670 This government intervention has been
criticized in the literature for providing a subsidy to the nuclear operator.671
660 Id.
661 See id.; Michael Faure & Ton Hartlief, Remedies for Expanding Liability, 18 OXFORD
J. LEGAL STUD. 681, 692 (1998).
662 See Faure & Fiore, An Economic Analysis, supra note 598, at 445.
663 Id. at 427.
664 Id.
665 Id.
666 Id. at 428.
667 See Faure & Fiore, An Economic Analysis, supra note 598, at 428.
668 Id.
669 € 91 million based on the operator’s liability cap, € 140 million based on the state’s
intervention, and € 150 million consisting of the contracting parties’ coverage. Id. at 430.
670 Consisting of € 700 million for the operator’s liability, € 500 million of state’s inter-
vention, and € 300 million of all contracting parties. Id.
671 See, e.g., Faure & Fiore, The Civil Liberty, supra note 659, at 227–48.
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These criticisms apply to a lesser extent to the U.S. regime. The
U.S. did not join the international conventions, but adopted its own Price-
Anderson Act in 1957.672 Under the Price-Anderson Act, there is no longer
(since 1975) government compensation: a first layer of operator’s liability
of $60 million is supplemented with a regime of retrospective premiums to
which all operators contribute.673 Now the individual liability of a nuclear
operator in the United States is $375 million supplemented with a second
layer (consisting of retrospective premiums) of $11.86 billion, leading to
a total amount of $12.2 billion, without any government intervention be-
yond an operator contribution from the Department of Energy to insure its
own nuclear activities.674 In comparison to the international regimes the
Price-Anderson Act has fewer inefficiencies because there is, in principle,
no government intervention.675
2. The Japanese Model: Strengths and Weaknesses
Japan adopted some principles similar to those of the international
regimes of nuclear liability, such as strict liability, channeling of liability to
operators, and compulsory financial security. But there are many differ-
ences as well. The first difference lies in the definition of nuclear damage
and the use of the administrative system. The international regime gives
a more detailed definition of nuclear damage. For example, under the sec-
ond generation of nuclear liability conventions, nuclear damage covers “loss
of life or personal injury; loss of or damage to property”; consequential
economic loss from personal injury and property damage; costs of envi-
ronment reinstatement, loss of income from use or enjoyment of the envi-
ronment and the costs of preventive measures.676 However, in Japan, the
definition of nuclear damage is quite simple and is silent on what type of
damage is compensable.677 Thus what composes “nuclear damage” depends
on the general tort rules and the application in practice. In Japan, the judi-
cial system is not favorable to nuclear victims because of the difficulties in
672 Price-Anderson Act, Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957) (amending the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954).
673 Faure & Vanden Borre, supra note 581, at 243.
674 Liability for Nuclear Damage, supra note 320.
675 This of course depends to the extent that the amount of $12.2 billion will be sufficient
to cover the costs of an average nuclear incident. For a more detailed comparison between
the international regime and the U.S. Price-Anderson Act, see generally Faure & Vanden
Borre, supra note 581, at 226–48.
676 2004 Paris Convention, Article I (vii).
677 Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage § 2.
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proving causation and the judges’ favorable attitude towards the nuclear
industry, as discussed above.678 On the contrary, most disputes are solved
through negotiations and settlements under guidance of the administrative
system. The Dispute Reconciliation Committee plays an important role
in determining the scope of compensable damage.679 The question can be
asked whether compensating victims via such an administrative system
takes place on the basis of specific criteria and hence leads to predictability
of the compensation. When looking at the compensation experiences for
nuclear damage in Japan, one can find consistency in the determinations
by the Dispute Reconciliation Committee.680 During the compensation for
damage for the JCO and Fukushima accidents, the Committee adopted
similar standards in awarding the compensation.681 The scope of compen-
sable damage in the Fukushima accident is broader, but this is under-
standable since this accident had a much more significant off-site impact,
and experience is still aggregated during the evolution of the compensation
process.682 If the administrative system keeps operating consistently and
develops predictable and clear standards for determining the compensable
damage, the administrative system can even ensure more efficient and com-
plete compensation for nuclear victims and give the nuclear industry more
incentives to internalize their full costs than the tort system.
A predictable administrative compensation system is possible in
Japan. Japan has a long history in compensating pollution victims through
an administrative system.683 Admittedly, the administrative scheme may
not always guarantee efficient compensation. The investigation procedure
needs to be more transparent and the standards used to identify compen-
sable damage need to be consistent. Hence, some combined use of the
administrative system and the tort system in Japan may be desirable, as
the tort system provides some external accountability and review of the
compensation scheme.
Japan also channeled the liability to the operator of the nuclear
power plant. This channeling takes place under the Act on Compensation
for Nuclear Damage of 1961.684 However, unlike the international regime
678 See supra Part II.E.2.
679 See supra Part II.D.2.c.
680 Tokai-Mura Accident, supra note 349, at 129–30.
681 Id.
682 See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text.
683 For the introduction of the administrative compensation scheme for pollution victims
in Japan, see A. Morishima, Environmental Liability in Japan, in MODERN TRENDS IN TORT
LAW: DUTCH AND JAPANESE LAW COMPARED 183, 191–93 (Ewoud Hondius ed., 1999).
684 Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage § 3.
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there may still be other possibilities in Japanese law which could lead to
liability of either the operator or other liable parties beyond the liability
based on the Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage.685 Moreover, the
Fukushima case provides an excellent example of the problematic nature
of channeling liability. The first reports on the Fukushima case made clear
that the meltdown of the nuclear reactors may have been caused by the
simple fact that the generators for the cooling system were located in the
basement of the turbine buildings, which of course made them very vulner-
able to a tsunami.686 The question could be asked whether this is the result
of negligent action by the operator TEPCO, or rather the result of bad de-
sign or engineering by General Electric. In the latter case a channeling
of the liability to the operator TEPCO would be particularly problematic
since channeling would lead to an exclusion of liability of all other parties
who contributed to the risk, in this particular case (at least potentially)
General Electric. Channeling may thus negatively affect incentives of
other parties involved in the risk. In that sense the Fukushima case can
once more provide an important back up for the general criticism formu-
lated on channeling.
As to the second aspect, the amount of compensation, the Japanese
regime set the required financial security at 120 billion yen.687 Remember
that under the international regime the total amount available (including
state aid) was € 381 million under the old conventions and will merely
be € 1.5 billion when the modification protocol of the Paris and Brussels
Convention of 2004 would enter into force.688 The amount in Japan is set
substantially higher than the first generation of the international regime,
but is similar to the second generation of the international regime and
lower than the U.S. regime. As discussed above, though no preset cap on
liability exists in the Act on Compensation, limited liability under corpo-
rate law may prevent the nuclear industry from internalizing the full cost
of injuries they cause. Under this situation, sufficient financial security is
necessary to guarantee efficient cost internalization. However, the amount
of 120 billion yen set in the Japanese system is completely insufficient
to cover the huge damage caused by the Fukushima accident.689 Analysis
685 For a detailed analysis of other potential sources of liability under Japanese law, see
Weitzdörfer, supra note 317, at 87–101. There may, for example, still be claims possible on
the basis of property law, but also under labor law or social security law. State liability can
still be examined, according to Weitzdörfer.
686 See Yoshida, supra note 489.
687 Vásquez-Maignan, supra note 471, at 9.
688 See supra notes 669–70 and accompanying text.
689 Supra Part II.E.
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based on a private interest approach to compensation shows that govern-
ment and judges may not have incentives to impose strict nuclear liability
on operators under the tort system.690 Nevertheless, the Fukushima acci-
dent shows that it remains important to set financial security at a suf-
ficiently high level to cover the total accident costs.
Thirdly, as far as the financing is concerned, Japan’s program
seems to do better than the international regime at compensating victims.
Currently, for example, of the total amount available under the inter-
national regime in France of € 381 million (486 million USD), only € 91
million would consist of operator’s liability whereas the remaining € 290
million (370 million USD) would consist of state aid.691 In Japan this
amount of 120 billion yen is in principle paid by the operator, either (in the
general case) via liability insurance or, in case of uninsurable risks (more
particularly damage resulting from earthquakes, tsunamis or volcanoes)
via an indemnity agreement with government.692 But the indemnity agree-
ment is, unlike state aid in the international regime, not a subsidy since
the operator has to pay a fee for the coverage provided by government via
the indemnity agreement.
Of course one could question whether the fee paid by the operator
for the indemnity agreement is comparable to commercially risk depend-
ent premiums that would be charged on a commercial insurance market.
One report shows that in 1998, the premium rate was set at an average
of 7.9 percent of the total amount of coverage,693 which is substantially
higher than the rate of indemnity fee (0.03% or 0.015%).694 However, it
should be born in mind that given the lack of actuarial data for nuclear
accidents, commercial premiums are usually set higher than the actuarial
premium. Thus the difference between the rate of indemnity fee and actu-
arial premium—a more accurate measure of risk—may not be that large.
On the positive side, at least in Japan, some money is asked from the oper-
ator for the government indemnity, whereas in the international regime the
state aid is provided for free—functionally, a complete subsidy. Therefore
less subsidy is given under the Japanese system. Moreover, unlike the
international regime there is in Japan in principle unlimited liability of the
690 Supra Part II.E.2.
691 Even after the entry into force of the modification protocol of 2004, only € 700 million of
the total amount of € 1.5 billion would be operator’s liability and a remaining € 800 million
would still be state aid. See supra note 295 and accompanying text.
692 See supra notes 609–10 and accompanying text.
693 Watabe, supra note 346, at 222.
694 Order for the Execution of the Act on Indemnity Agreements for Compensation of
Nuclear Damage § 3.
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operator beyond the amount of 120 billion yen,695 for which the operator
must seek either liability insurance or an indemnity agreement. Hence,
the Japanese system has less of a subsidy effect than the international
regime, and thus better prospects of cost internalization by the operator.
It is worth noting that the advantages of the Japanese system com-
pared to the international regimes do not mean that there is no subsidy
to the nuclear industry at all. The above discussion of the newly founded
Nuclear Damage Compensation Facilitation Corporation shows that an
ex post risk sharing agreement is established in Japan.696 In such a system,
both TEPCO and other nuclear operators are asked to contribute to the
Corporation, which helps and promotes compensation for nuclear victims.697
This seems similar to the U.S. system where retrospective premiums are
asked from operators.698 It is held that this system can give operators in-
centives to monitor each other and improve nuclear safety. At this stage it
is not clear yet how the various nuclear operators will contribute to the Cor-
poration. The system is, moreover, only established after the Fukushima
incident took place.699 Thus, such an ex post system may fail to create in-
centives for nuclear operators for mutual monitoring. Besides, the govern-
ment also helps the compensation through the issuance of government
bonds and government guarantee bonds. Those instruments can lead to
a subsidy as well.
CONCLUSION
On March 11, 2011, the world was shocked by the story of a 9.0 on
the Richter scale earthquake and the following spectacular tsunami, which
together killed over 15,000 people.700 When a few days afterwards the dev-
astating results of the tsunami were assessed, it became clear that the
worst was probably still to come. The tsunami also led to the failure of the
emergency diesel generators for the cooling systems in the nuclear power
plant at Fukushima, causing a meltdown in various reactors.701 This led to
a unique combination of natural and technological disasters, leading to a
695 Weitzdörfer, supra note 317, at 70–71.
696 See supra Part II.D.2.e.
697 See supra Part II.D.2.e.
698 Faure & Vanden Borre, supra note 581, at 243.
699 See METI Outline, supra note 567.
700 See Damage Situation and Police Countermeasures, supra note 4.
701 CNNWORLD, supra note 487.
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spectacularly high amount of damage and giving rise to many new ques-
tions concerning the legal duty to compensate.
The Japanese nuclear compensation laws make clear that different
rules are needed for damage caused by a natural disaster, like an earth-
quake or a tsunami, where no injurer can be identified and held liable, and
damage caused by nuclear accidents which qualify as technological disas-
ters where liability rules can be applied to an identifiable party.
Carefully examining the way compensation is provided to the vic-
tims of both the earthquake/tsunami and the nuclear incident is important,
not only to understand to what extent victims can be adequately compen-
sated, but also to see what lessons can be learned from the Japanese ex-
perience. One interesting aspect of Japan’s earthquake compensation
model is that it, as is increasingly the case in many legal systems, largely
relies on private insurance.702 As in the U.S. (which has programs like the
CEA and NFIP) insurance is not mandatory, but is supplemented with
state-provided reinsurance to promote the insurability of the earthquake
risk. Still the use of insurance solutions, as compared to outright state
aid, has the advantage that premiums can be differentiated according to
risk, which is also the case in Japanese earthquake insurance.703 Hence,
the insurance system can provide adequate incentives to reduce the earth-
quake risk by rewarding those that installed risk-reducing measures with
lower premiums.
The compensation model for nuclear accidents also provides inter-
esting lessons for the international community. The operator’s duty to seek
financial guarantees up to a certain amount—a coverage floor—is supple-
mented with unlimited potential liability. Moreover, the indemnity agree-
ment with the government involves the payment of a fee by the operator
for the compensation that will be provided by government. This provides
an important lesson that state intervention in the compensation of catas-
trophes should not (as is often the case) be provided for free. Charging a
price for government intervention has the major advantage that a sub-
sidy effect is avoided, guaranteeing provision of financial incentives and
disincentives for risk-reducing behavior by operators and victims.
Of course questions still arise as to whether either the earthquake
insurance regime or the compensation system for nuclear liability will be
able to provide full compensation to the victims. It may be too early for such
a final assessment, since the damage has not yet been completely assessed.
702 See supra Part I.A.
703 See Table 2, supra Part I.A.1.b.
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But the Fukushima case again shows that a careful design of the com-
pensation regime of catastrophic risks is important, not only in the light
of providing adequate compensation to victims, but also as an instrument
to provide incentives for prevention. The mere fact that the Fukushima
incident may have been caused, not only by operator’s wrongful behavior,
but probably by a design failure again shows the problematic nature of
an exclusive channeling of liability to the operator.704
Studying the compensation for victims of the March 11, 2011,
tsunami and the subsequent nuclear incident at Fukushima in Japan is
therefore undoubtedly not only interesting for those directly involved in
the compensation of the victims, but can provide yet another alert to the
international community that the inefficient design of some international
conventions need to be seriously reexamined.
704 See supra Part II.d.2.a.
